By Indicator detail
Please find below the lists of indicators that have been used to analyse each law. You can click on each of them and you will get the result for that indicator in each country.
| Country | Description | Scoring instructions | Max score | Finding | Points | Article | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Law on Protection of Personal Data: Article 33: "The Commissioner shall be elected by the Assembly upon a proposal of the Council of Ministers for a 5 year term eligible for re-election" Article 36. Paragraph 1 and 2: "1. The mandate of the Commissioner shall have an early termination when: a) he is given a final court decision for committing a criminal offence; b) he is absent from duty without justification for more than one month; c) he resigns; a final court decision declares his ineffectiveness. 2. The Commissioner may be discharged by the Assembly when: a) he fails to act in compliance with the provisions arising from this law or other legal acts; b) he engages in activities that generate a conflict of interests; c) cases of incompatibility with the function are identified" Article 34: "The function of the Commissioner shall be incompatible with every other state function, affiliation in political parties and partaking in their activities, with every other profitable activity, save teaching." | 1-The appointing procedures of the commissioner is prescribed in Law No. 9887 dated 10.03.2008 As amended by the Law No. 48/2012, date 26.04.2012 On protection of personal data 2- The commisioner is elected by a multi-party bodie 3- The law indicates the term of office for the commissioner 3- The law gives clear and detailed measures for dissmisal |
| Angola | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 18(1) The Monitoring Commission is made up of the following members: (a) a judge from the Chamber of Civil and Administrative Law nominated by the Judicial High Council, who shall be the Chair; (b) two Members of Parliament elected by the National Assembly, reflecting a multi-party composition; (c) a law professor nominated by the President; (d) two persons of high standing nominated by the government; (e) a lawyer nominated by the Law Society. (2) Any member may at his initiative be replaced by an alternate appointed by the same entity that appointed him or her. (3) The terms of office of members shall be two years, renewable; without prejudice to [the expected] termination when a member ceases to perform the functions which led to his or her appointment. (4) All members may serve their terms over and above their other functions. (5) Rights and benefits of the members are set out in a regulations instrument of the present law. (6) Entities having an interest in matters being discussed at a given session of the commission may have a representative present, without the right to vote. | Art 18 - No mention of security of tenure, but the appointments process is diverse enough to ensure independence. |
| Antigua and Barbuda | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 35(1) The Governor-General, acting on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and with the approval of both Houses of Parliament signified by resolution, shall appoint an Information Commissioner for the purposes of this Act, on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the instrument of his appointment. (2) A person shall not be qualified to hold office as Commissioner if that person (a) is a member of the House of Representatives or a Senator; (b) holds or is acting in a public office; (c) is an undischarged bankrupt, having been declared bankrupt under any law; (d) has, within the period of ten years immediately preceding his appointment, been convicted of theft, fraud or other such offence involving dishonesty; or (e) holds office in, or is an employee of, a political party. (3) The Commissioner shall hold office for a term of [five] years and may be re-appointed for a further term of five years, but shall not hold office for more than two consecutive terms. (4) The Commissioner may be removed from office by the Governor-General, for misconduct, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and with the approval of both Houses of Parliament signified by resolution. | Art 35 - Appointed by GG with approval of both houses on recommendation of PM. Requires agreement of GG, PM and both houses for a dismissal. |
| Armenia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | HRD Law Article 12 1. Everyone having attained the age of 25, enjoying high authority within the public, having higher education, having been a citizen of solely the Republic of Armenia for the preceding four years, permanently residing in the Republic of Armenia for the preceding four years, and having the right of suffrage, as well as having command of the Armenian language may be elected to the office of the Defender. 2. The Defender shall be elected by the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, upon recommendation of the competent standing committee of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, by at least three fifths of votes of the total number of the members of the Parliament, for a term of six years. HRD Law Article 13(1) The powers of the Defender shall terminate upon expiry of the term of his or her office, in cases of loss of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia or acquisition of a citizenship of another state, when a criminal judgment of conviction rendered against him or her becomes final, a judgment on declaring him or her as having no active legal capacity, as missing or dead becomes final, in case of his or her death or resignation. | |
| Azerbaijan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Law on the Human Rights Commissioner, Article 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 | Nominated by President and elected by 83 votes (2/3) of parliament. Tenure protected. |
| Bahamas | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Section 30. Office of Information Commissioner. (1) There shall be a person who shall be known as the Information Commissioner who shall be appointed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition (2) The Commissioner shall be appointed for a period of five years and may on the expiration of the first or any subsequent term of five years and may on the expiration of the first or any subsequent term of office be reappointed for a period not exceeding five years. Section 33. Independence and powers. (1) The Commissioner is not to be regarded as a public officer under the Public Service Act (Ch. 39). (2) The Commissioner shall have all powers, direct and incidental, as are necessary to undertake his functions as provided for under this Act, and for this purpose may establish a Freedom of Information Unit. (3) The Commissioner shall enjoy independence and autonomy in operating and administering the Freedom of Information Unit. (4) The Commissioner shall develop his own rules and procedures to regulate its affairs through a process of consultation. (5) In the exercise of his powers, the Commissioner shall be responsible to Parliament. Section 36. Removal of the Information Commissioner. The Commissioner may be removed from office by the Governor-General for - (a) misbehaviour; or (b) inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause). | |
| Bangladesh | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 14: "Selection Committee.- (1) A selection committee shall consist of the following 5 (five) members with a view to providing recommendation for the appointment of the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners, namely:- (a) a judge of the Appellate Division, nominated by the Chief Justice, who shall also be its Chairman; (b) the Cabinet Secretary of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh; (c) one member from the ruling party and one from the opposition, nominated by the Speaker while the Parliament is in session; (d) one representative nominated by the Government from among the persons involved in the profession of journalism holding a post equivalent to the editor or a prominent member of the society related to mass communication. (2) The Ministry of Information shall provide necessary secretarial assistance to constitute the selection committee under sub-section (1) and to carry out the functions of such selection committee. (3) The presence of at least 3 (three) members shall constitute the quorum of the selection committee. (4) In order to appoint the Chief Information Commissioner and the Information Commissioners, the selection committee shall, on the basis of the decision of the majority members present at the meeting, recommend 2 (two) names against each vacant post. (5) In the event of equality of votes in the selection committee, the Chairman shall have right to a second or a casting vote. (6) The selection committee shall prescribe the procedure of its meetings. (7) No act or proceeding of the selection committee shall be invalid merely on the ground of existence of any vacancy in or any defect in the constitution of the committee and no question shall be raised in this regard." 16: "Removal of the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners.- (1) The Chief Information Commissioner and any Information Commissioner shall not be removed from his office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the President may remove the Chief Information Commissioner or any Information Commissioner from their respective offices, if he- (a) is declared by a competent court to be insolvent; (b) engages himself in any post extraneous to his own duties during his term of office for remuneration; (c) is declared by a competent court to be of unsound mind; (d) is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude." | Art 14 deals with the appointments process. Art 16 protects tenure. |
| Benin | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 14: La Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication est composée de neuf membres nommés par Décret par le Président de la République dans les conditions définies par la présente loi organique. 16: La Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication est composée de neuf membres désignés à raison de: – trois (3) par le bureau de l’Assemblée National – trois (3) par le Président de la République – trois (3) par les journalistes professionnels et les techniciens des communications et des télécommunications. 17: La Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication est dirigée par un bureau composé de: – un (1) Président – un (1) Vice Président – deux (2) Rapporteurs. Ce bureau est assisté d’un Secrétariat Administratif. Le Président de la Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication est nommé après consultation du Président de l’Assemblée Nationale, par décret pris en conseil des Ministres. Les autres membres du bureau excepté le Président sont élus par leurs pairs au scrutin secret et à la majorité absolue. 18: La durée des fonctions des membres de la Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication est de cinq (5) ans. Le mandat n’est ni révocable, ni renouvelable. | Loi Organique, N° 92-021 du 21 Aout 1992 Relative a la Haute Autorite de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication (H.A.A.C.) |
| Bolivia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 219(I) The Office of the Public Defender shall be directed by the Public Defender, who shall performs his or her functions for a period of six years, without possibility of a new designation. 220. The Public Defender shall be designated by at least two-thirds of the members present of the Pluri-National Legislative Assembly. The designation shall require a prior public announcement and determination of professional capacity and merit through a public competition among persons recognized for their career in defense of human rights. | Provisions from Constitution. See also Articles 9-12 of the Law on the Public Defender, No. 870, 13 December 2016 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Article 9 of the Law on the human right ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina 22/01/2001 "The Ombudsmen shall be appointed by the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina by a two-thirds majority of each House, following a joint proposal by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina". | |
| Burkina Faso | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Article 56 : L’Autorité est composée de neuf membres nommés par décret pris en Conseil des ministres ainsi qu’il suit : - deux membres désignés par le Président du Faso dont un représentant des forces de défense et un représentant des forces de sécurité ; - un membre désigné par le Président de l’Assemblée nationale parmi les personnes qualifiées en matière de propriété intellectuelle ; - un membre du corps médical, désigné par les ordres professionnels du secteur de la santé ; - un magistrat représentant les juridictions de l’ordre administratif, désigné par le président du Conseil d’Etat ; 23 - un membre désigné par les organisations de défense des droits de l’homme ; - un membre désigné par l’association des professionnels des archives et de la documentation ; - un membre désigné par le président de la Commission de l’informatique et des libertés qualifié en matière de protection des données à caractère personnel ; - un membre des médias, désigné par les associations des professionnels de médias. L’ANAIP est dirigé par un Président. Article 59 : Tout membre de l’ANAIP peut démissionner en adressant sa lettre de démission au Président de l'Autorité. Les membres de l’Autorité ne peuvent être destitués que pour une faute lourde sur proposition des trois quarts des membres. La destitution est prononcée par décret pris en Conseil des ministres. Article 62: Les membres de l’Autorité nationale d’accès à l’information publique portent le titre de commissaire à l’information. Les commissaires à l’information sont nommés pour un mandat de six ans non renouvelable. Le renouvellement par tiers des autres premiers membres de l’ANAIP se fait par tirage au sort. 25 Toutefois, les membres de l’ANAIP sont renouvelables par tiers tous les deux ans et le premier renouvèlement intervient deux ans après l’installation de l’Autorité. Le Président et le Vice-président de l’ANAIP sont élus pour la durée du mandat. | |
| Canada | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 54 (1) The Governor in Council shall, by commission under the Great Seal, appoint an Information Commissioner after consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and House of Commons and approval of the appointment by resolution of the Senate and House of Commons. 54 (2) Subject to this section, the Information Commissioner holds office during good behaviour for a term of seven years, but may be removed for cause by the Governor in Council at any time on address of the Senate and House of Commons. | |
| Croatia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Art.35.2.: The Commissioner may not be impeached, taken into custody or punished for expressing opinions and taking actions within the scope of their work, unless the Commissioner has broken the law, which represents a criminal offence. Not mentioned. Art.36.: (1) The Commissioner is appointed by the Croatian Parliament for a five year mandate, including the possibility of re-appointment. (2) No later than six months since the end of the Commissioner's mandate, i.e. no later than 30 days from the end of their duties due to other reasons, the Committee for the Constitution, Rules of Procedure and Political System of the Croatian Parliament shall announce a public invitation for the delivery of candidacies for appointment of the Commissioner. (3) The Committee for the Constitution, Rules of Procedure and Political System of the Croatian Parliament shall, upon acquiring the prior consent of the Committee on Information, Informatization and Media of the Croatian Parliament, make a proposal of at least two candidates for the Commissioner on the basis of applications collected following the public invitation and shall submit the proposal to the Croatian Parliament. (4) The Commissioner shall be independent in their work, and accountable to the Croatian Parliament. Art.38.: (1) The Croatian Parliament shall discharge the Commissioner prior to the end of his/her term in the cases as follow: upon the request of the Commissioner, in the event of the circumstances due to which the Commissioner no longer meets the requirements as referred to in Article 37 of this Law, if the Commissioner has been unable to perform his/her duties in the period longer than six months, if the Commissioner fails to perform duties in accordance with this Law. (2) The procedure of discharging the Commissioner shall be initiated by the Committee for the Constitution, Rules of Regulations and Political System of the Croatian Parliament. (3) The Commissioner shall be discharged by the Croatian Parliament, provided the prior opinion of the Committee for Information, Information and Media of the Croatian Parliament. | Appointment procedure: parliamentary committee for constitution announces a public call, it seeks opinion of parliamentary committees for informing and then suggests at least two candidates to be appointed by the Croatian Parliament (simple majority). There exists a procedure for discharge of the Commissioner. |
| Denmark | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Danish Ombudsman Act, Article 1, Section 1. "...the Folketing shall elect an Ombudsman." | Article provides that The Ombudsman is not protected against arbitrary dismissal (1 point loss). This article does not mean that the Ombudsman is not independent. It is not chosen by the Government, but by the Parliament. |
| Ethiopia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 11 The objectives of this part of the Proclamation are: (1) to give effect to the right of citizens to access, receive and import information held by public bodies, subject to justifiable limits based on overridi ng public and private interests; (2) to establish mechanisms and procedures to give effect to that right in a manner which enables persons to obtain information as quickly, inexpensively and effortlessly as is reasonably possible; and (3) to encourage and promote public participation, public empowerment, to foster a culture of transparecy, accountablity and effecincy in the functions of public bodies and to encourage and promote good governance." 16(1) Any public relation officer, must reject a request for access to a record of the public body if its disclosure would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about a third party, including a deceased individual who has passed away before 20 years. (2) A request referred to in sub-article(1) of this Article may not be refused if the record consists of information:- a) with respect to which the third party has not protested against disclosure under Article 19 of this Proclamation or has consented in writing to its disclosure to the person who has made the request; b) that was submitted to the public body by the individual to whom it relates and the individual was informed by or on behalf of the public body, before it had been submitted, that the information belongs to a class of information that would or might be made available to the public; c) that has already been publicly available; d) about an individual's physical or mental health, or well- being, who is under the care of the requestor or under the age of 18 years or incapable of understanding the nature of the request, and giving access would be in the individual's best interests; e) about an individual who is deceased and the requester is the individual's next of kin or the requester has secured the written consent of the individual's next of kin; or f) about an individual who is or was an employee of a public body and which relates to the position of functions of the individual, including; the position or status of the individual, the title, work address, office phone number and other similar addreses of the individual, the classification, salary scale, remuneration and responsibilities of the position held or services performed by the individual and the name of the individual on a record prepared by the individual in the course of employment. 17(1) The public relation officer shall refuse a request for information if the requested information contains; a) trade secrets of a third party; b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information, other than trade secrets, of a third party, the disclosure of which would likely to cause harm to the commercial or financial interests of that third party; or c) information supplied in confidence by a third party the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to put that third party at disadvantage in contractual or other negotiations; or to prejudice that third party in commercial competition. (2) A record may not be refused in terms of sub-article (1) of this Article insofar as it consists of information; a) already publicly available; b) in relation to which a third party did not object to the disclosure under Article 19 or has consented in writing to its disclosure to the requester concerned; or c) about the results of any product or environmental testing or other investigation supplied by a third party or the result of any such testing or investigation carried out by or on behalf of a third party and its disclosure reveals a serious public safety or environmental risk. (3) The information referred to in sub-article (2)(c) of this Article may not include the results of preliminary testing of other investigation conducted for the purpose of developing methods of testing or other investigation. | Art 11 of the Ombudsmen Act has a relatively good appointments procedure. Art 16 and 17 grant security of tenure. |
| Fiji | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Article 121(2) The Commission shall consist of a chairperson and 2 other members appointed by the President, on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission following consultation by it with the Attorney-General. [...[ (4) The members of the Commission shall be appointed for a term of 3 years and shall be eligible for re-appointment. [...] (6) The members of the Commission may be removed from office for inability to perform the functions of office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour, and may not otherwise be removed. (7) The procedure for removal of the members of the Commission from office shall be the same as the procedure for removal of a judicial officer under section 112. [...] (10) In the performance of its functions or the exercise of its authority and powers, the Commission shall be independent and shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority, except by a court of law or as otherwise prescribed by written law. | Basically the same protections as apply to judges. Provisions from the Constitution. |
| France | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Article 23. | |
| Gambia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 42(2) Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President, after consultation with the Public Service Commission and subject to confirmation by the National Assembly. (3) The Chairperson of the Commission shall hold office for five years and all other COmmissioners shall hold office for four years and be eligible for re-appointment to one further term of five years. 44(2) The office of a Commissioner shall become vacant if he or she - (a) is absent from three meetings of the Commission without permission from the Chairperson, and in case of the Chairperson if he or she is absent from three meetings without the permission of the Minister; (b) is declared insolvent or adjudged bankrupt; (c) is convicted of a felony or an offence involving dishonesty; (d) is declared to be of unsound mind or physically incapable of carrying out the functions and duties of a Commissioner; (e) is found to be incompetent; (f) dies; or (g) commits gross misconduct. 45 (1) The President shall only remove a Commissioner from office after an independent inquiry is conducted into the allegation levelled against the Commissioner and the report of the independent inquiry confirms the allegation. (2) A decision to terminate the appointment shall be approved by the National Assembly before the Commissioner is terminated. | |
| Georgia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | [Organic Law of Georgia on the Public Defender] Article 6(1) The Public Defender of Georgia shall be a citizen of Georgia. (2) The Public Defender shall be appointed for a term of 5 years by a majority of all members of the Parliament of Georgia. Candidates can be nominated by the President of Georgia, parliamentary factions or a group of at least 6 parliament members who do not belong to any faction. (16.07.2009 N 1460) (3) Before the vote, the Chairperson of the Parliament shall read out the list of nominees and present to the Parliament their written consent to run for the office of the Public Defender. Each candidate shall be voted upon separately by secret ballot. (4) The candidate receiving the highest number of votes but not less than a majority of the total number of the Parliament members, shall be elected. If two or more candidates receive the requisite but equal number of votes, the final determination shall be made by the Parliament voting on these candidates together. The candidate who wins a greater number of votes but not less than a majority of all the members of the Parliament shall be appointed. In the event of a tie, there will be a runoff voting until one candidate gains a majority of votes. (5) If no candidate receives the requisite number of votes, a new vote shall be held. The date for the vote shall be set not earlier than 7 days and not later than 14 days from the first vote. Procedures for the presentation of candidates and voting shall be the same as provided for in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article. (6) The same candidate can only be nominated twice during one appointment cycle. Article 10(1) The tenure of the Public Defender shall be subject to premature termination in the event he/she: (a) loses citizenship; (b) is unable to serve for four consecutive months; (c) is found guilty in the final judgment of the court; (d) is recognized to be lacking legal capacity, missing or deceased by the court; (e) has accepted or holds a position or carries out activities incompatible with the Public Defendant's office; (f) resigns; (g) dies. (2) In cases referred to in paragraph 1 above, the term of office of the Public Defender shall be considered terminated from the moment any of the stipulated grounds are established. This shall be notified without delay to the Parliament. (3) In cases stipulated in sub-paragraphs (b) and (e) of paragraph 1 above, the term of office of the Public Defender shall be terminated by the decision of the Parliament adopted by a majority of all members of the Parliament. | The article provides: "The Public Defender shall be appointed for a term of 5 years by a majority of all members of the Parliament of Georgia.". |
| Germany | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | [Federal Data Protection Act] (BDSG) Section 23. | Link to Federal Data Protection Act (in English) here. Note, that in January 2016, the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (BfDI) will be transformed into a completely independent, stand-alone supreme federal authority. |
| Greece | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | [The Constitution of Greece] SECTION VI - Chapter I - Management of Administration. Article 101(A)(1) Wherever the Constitution envisages the establishment and operation of an independent authority, its members are appointed for a specified period of duty and are abided by personal and operational independence, as the law provides. (2) [...] The individuals employed in independent authorities should possess the correspondent qualities, as the law provides. Their selection is made according to the ruling of the Board of Parliament Chairmen, with unanimity if possible, or whatsoever, with the increased plebiscite of four-fifths of its members. A Parliament Regulation provides for issues regarding the selection procedure. (3) The Parliament Regulation regulates the issues regarding the relation between the Parliament and the independent authorities as well as the parliamentary control mode. | |
| Honduras | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | ARTÍCULO 9. INTEGRACION Y DIRECCION. El Instituto de Acceso a la Información Publica (IAIP) estará integrado por tres (3) comisionados, electos por el Congreso Nacional, por las dos terceras partes de votos de la totalidad de sus miembros, escogidos de entre candidatos que se propongan así: (1) Dos (2), el Presidente de la Republica; (2) Dos (2), la Procuraduría General de la Republica (PGR); (3) Dos (2), el Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos; (4) Dos (2), el Foro Nacional de Convergencia FONAC); y, (5) Dos (2) por el Tribunal Superior de Cuentas. Duraran en sus cargos (5) cinco anos, y solo podrán ser sustituidos por imposibilidad legal o natural, cuando sus actuaciones entren en conflicto con la naturaleza de las funciones del Instituto. La Presidencia del Instituto de Acceso a la Información Publica (IAIP), ostentara Representación Legal. La designación del Presidente será hecha por el Congreso Nacional. Los Comisionados resolverán colegiadamente todos sus asuntos. | Article 9 - elected by the national congress with a requirement of a 2/3 majority vote and a diverse selection process. They also seems to have security of tenure. |
| India | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Article 12(1) The Central Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a body to be known as the Central Information Commission to exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform the functions assigned to, it under this Act. (2) The Central Information Commission shall consist of (a) the Chief Information Commissioner; and (b) such number of Central Information Commissioners, not exceeding ten, as may be deemed necessary. (3) The Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee consisting of (i) the Prime Minister, who shall be the Chairperson of the committee; (ii) the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha; and (iii) a Union Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Prime Minister. For the purposes of removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that where the Leader of Opposition in the House of the People has not been recognised as such, the Leader of the single largest group in opposition of the Government in the House of the People shall be deemed to be the Leader of Opposition. (4) The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the Central Information Commission shall vest in the Chief Information Commissioner who shall be assisted by the Information Commissioners and may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things which may be exercised or done by the Central Information Commission autonomously without being subjected to directions by any other authority under this Act. (5) The Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance. (6) The Chief Information Commissioner or an Information Commissioner shall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession. (7) The headquarters of the Central Information Commission shall be at Delhi and the Central Information Commission may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, establish offices at other places in India. Article 13(1) The Chief Information Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall not be eligible for reappointment: Provided that no Chief Information Commissioner shall hold office as such after he has attained the age of sixty-five years. (2) Every Information Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or till he attains the age of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier, and shall not be eligible for reappointment as such Information Commissioner: Provided that every Information Commissioner shall, on vacating his office under this sub-section be eligible for appointment as the Chief Information Commissioner in the manner specified in sub-section (3) of section 12: Provided further that where the Information Commissioner is appointed as the Chief Information Commissioner, his term of office shall not be more than five years in aggregate as the Information Commissioner and the Chief Information Commissioner. | |
| Ireland | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Article 43(2) The Commissioner shall be a corporation sole with perpetual succession and an official seal and with power - (a) to sue and be sued, and (b) with the consent of the Minister and the Minister for Finance, to acquire, hold and dispose of land or an interest in land, and to acquire, hold and dispose of any other property. (3) The Commissioner shall be independent in the performance of his or her functions. (4) The appointment of a person to be the Commissioner shall be made by the President on the advice of the Government following a resolution passed by Dáil Éireann and by Seanad Éireann recommending the appointment of the person. | |
| Kenya | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | [Commission on Administrative Justice Act, 2011] Article 11(1) The President shall, within fourteen days of the commencement of this Act convene a selection panel for the purpose of selecting suitable candidates for appointment as the chairperson or member of the Commission. (2) The selection panel convened under subsection (1) shall consist of one person from each of the following bodies representatively - (a) Office of the President; (b) Office of the Prime Minister; (c) Ministry responsible for matters relating to justice; (d) Public Service Commission; (e) the Association of Professional Societies in East Africa; and (f) the National Council for Persons with Disabilities. (3) The selection panel shall, subject to this section, determine its own procedure and the Ministry responsible for Public Service shall provide it with such facilities and other support as it may require for the discharge of its functions. (4) The selection panel shall, within seven days of its convening, invite applications from qualified persons and publish the names and qualifications of all applicants in the Gazette and two daily newspapers of national circulation. (5) The selection panel shall, within seven days of receipt of applications under subsection (4), consider the applications, interview and shortlist at least three persons qualified for appointment as chairperson and five persons qualified for appointment as members of the Commission, and shall forward the names of the selected candidates to the President for nomination. (6) Until after the first general election after the commencement of this Act, the President in consultation with the Prime Minister shall, within seven days of receipt of the names forwarded under subsection (5), nominate one person for appointment as chairperson and two persons for appointment as members of the Commission, and shall forward the names of the persons nominated to the National Assembly. (7) The National Assembly shall, within twenty-one days of the day it next sits after receipt of the names of the nominees under subsection (6), consider all the nominations received and approve or reject any nomination. (8) Where the National Assembly approves the nominees, the Speaker shall, forward the names of the approved persons to the President for appointment. (9) The President shall, within seven days of the receipt of the approved nominees from the National Assembly, by notice in the Gazette, appoint the chairperson and members approved by the National Assembly. (10) Where the National Assembly rejects any nomination, the Speaker shall, within three days, communicate the decision of the National Assembly to the President to submit fresh nominations. (11) Where a nominee is rejected by Parliament under subsection (10), the President in consultation with the Prime Minister shall, within seven days, submit to the National Assembly a fresh nomination from amongst the persons shortlisted and forwarded by the selection panel under subsection (5). (12) If Parliament rejects all or any subsequent nominee submitted by the President for approval under subsection (11), the provisions of subsections (5) and (6) shall apply. (13) In shortlisting, nominating or appointing persons as chairperson and members of the Commission, the selection panel the National Assembly and the President shall ensure that not more than two-thirds of the members are of the same gender, shall observe the principle of gender equity, regional and ethnic balance and shall have due regard to the principle of equal opportunities for persons with disabilities. (14) After the first elections after the commencement of this Act, the member of the selection panel specified under subsection (2)(b) shall be replaced by a representative of the Public Service Commission. (15) Despite the foregoing provisions of this section, the President, in consultation with the Prime Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, extend the period specified in respect of any matter under this section by a period not exceeding twenty-one days. (16) Removal from office The chairperson or member of the Commission may be removed from office in accordance with Article 251 of the Constitution. [Constitution] Article 251(1) A member of a commission (other than an ex officio member), or the holder of an independent office, may be removed from office only for - (a) serious violation of this Constitution or any other law, including a contravention of Chapter Six; (b) gross misconduct, whether in the performance of the member's or office holder's functions or otherwise; (c) physical or mental incapacity to perform the functions of office; (d) incompetence; or (e) bankruptcy. (2) A person desiring the removal of a member of a commission or of a holder of an independent office on any ground specified in clause (1) may present a petition to the National Assembly setting out the alleged facts constituting that ground. (3) The National Assembly shall consider the petition and, if it is satisfied that it discloses a ground under clause (1), shall send the petition to the President. (4) On receiving a petition under clause (3), the President - (a) may suspend the member or office holder pending the outcome of the complaint; and (b) shall appoint a tribunal in accordance with clause (5). (5) The tribunal shall consist of - (a) a person who holds or has held office as a judge of a superior court, who shall be the chairperson; (b) at least two persons who are qualified to be appointed as High Court judges; and (c) one other member who is qualified to assess the facts in respect of the particular ground for removal. (6) The tribunal shall investigate the matter expeditiously, report on the facts and make a binding recommendation to the President, who shall act in accordance with the recommendation within thirty days. (7) A person suspended under this Article is entitled to continue to receive one-half of the remuneration and benefits of the office while suspended. | |
| Kosovo | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Data Protection Law 29(1) The National Agency for the Protection of Personal Data is an independent agency in charge of supervising the implementation of data protection rules. Its members act independently in accordance with this Law and must not take any instructions from third parties. It shall respond to the Kosovo Assembly. 30(1) The Agency is presided by a Council consisting of the Chief State Supervisor and four (4) National Supervisors. (Hereinafter: the Supervisors). At least one of the Council members must have a university degree in law. Decisions of the Council shall be taken by simple majority. 30(2) The Chief State Supervisor shall represent the Agency, organize and coordinate its work. 31(2) The Chief State Supervisor shall be appointed by the National Assembly on the proposal of the Kosovo Government for a period of five (5) years and may be reappointed once. 34(1) The members of the Council may be released from their duties only in the following cases: (1.1) if they tender a statement of resignation to the Kosovo Assembly; (1.2) if they are convicted with a final decision of a criminal offence with prison of over six (6) months; (1.3) neglect of official duty; (1.4) if they cannot perform their duties for health or other important reasons for more than six (6) months; (1.5) if they become permanently incapable of performing their duties. (2) The members of the Council shall be released from their duties early and their position shall cease on the day the Kosovo Assembly determines the reasons from paragraph 1 of this Article. 35(1) In the performance of their tasks the members of the Council act in complete independence and are only bound by this Law, the Constitution and other relevant laws. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties and cannot exercise any other occupation whether gainful or not. (2) The members of the Council shall closely work together and shall assist each other in the performance of their duties. | |
| Kyrgyzstan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Law on Ombudsman, 4. Requirements for a candidate for the position of Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) and election of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) (1) Any citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic may be elected as the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy). (2) A person convicted for commitment of a crime may not be elected as the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) unless such conviction has been discharged or removed in accordance with the law. (3) The President of the Kyrgyz Republic, factions of deputies, groups of deputies of the Legislative Assembly and the Assembly of People's representatives of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic that consist of at least 7 persons who are not members of any faction, as well as political parties and civil associations shall have the right to make nominations for a position of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) of the Kyrgyz Republic to the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic. Committee of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic for human rights shall draw up a reasonable opinion on every nominee for the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic. (4) The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall be elected for the position by the Legislative Assembly of the Kyrgyz Republic by secret vote through submission of bulletins. (5) Deputies shall vote separately for each candidate for a position of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy). (6) The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall be considered as elected if the candidate has received the simple majority vote of the deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic. (7) If more than one candidate has received enough votes to be elected but the winner may not be established due to the same number of votes cast for each candidate, the deputies shall vote for several such candidates at the same time whereas the candidate who gets more votes shall be considered as elected. In case of equal distribution of votes the procedure of election shall be repeated until the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) is elected. (8) If none of the candidates has received enough votes to be elected, then second election is made not earlier than 7 days and not later than 14 days after the time of the original election. (9) One and the same candidate may be nominated only twice within the same round of election. (10) The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall be elected at least 30 days prior to the expiration of the term of the previous Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) in the office. (11) In case of earlier termination of powers of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) for reasons stated in the article 7 of this Law, election of a new Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) must be appointed within 1 month. (12) Upon expiration of the term, the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall stay in the office until inauguration of the successor. (13) The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) of the Kyrgyz Republic shall be elected for a term of five years. (14) One and the same person may not act as the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) for more than two terms running. (15) The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) of the Kyrgyz Republic shall not have more than three deputies. Deputies shall be appointed by the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic upon nomination by the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy). 6. Legal status of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) (1) The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall be independent from any bodies of the public administration or officials. Interventions into activities of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) or any influence upon the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall be prohibited and entail responsibility in accordance with the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic. (2) Introduction of the martial law or the emergency situation throughout the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic shall not result in the termination, limitation or the suspension of the duties of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy). (3) The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall have immunity throughout the whole term in the office and within 24 months after expiration of the term in the office. The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) may not be arrested, may not be subject to legal proceedings, penalty, persecution or trial on account of his/her opinion formulated, or the actions performed in connection with professional duties. (4) In other cases and while in the office the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy), without consent of the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic may not be subject to criminal or administrative liability imposed by a court, or retained, arrested, searched, except in case of being caught at the scene of a crime, and may not be subject to a search or personal examination except in cases stipulated by the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic for reasons of safety of other people. Immunity of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall also extend to his/her dwelling and working premises, luggage, personal and official vehicles, correspondence, means of communication and personal documents. (5) In case of arrest of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) at the scene of a crime, the arresting official must immediately inform the Office of the General Prosecutor (Procuracy). The Office of the General Prosecutor must notify the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic which must then make a decision and agree with continuation of this procedure of detention. The Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) must be immediately released if the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic has not given its consent with the detention of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) within 24 hours. (6) In case the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic has agreed, only the office of the General Prosecutor of the Kyrgyz Republic may start a criminal case in respect of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy). (7) The status of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall not be compatible with the mandate of a deputy, political appointment or political activity; with active involvement with bodies of the public administration; membership in a political party or leadership of a political party, membership in a professional union, association or foundation; or employment with such; with legal or fiscal functioning or any kind of professional, commercial or labor activity. (8) In any of the above mentioned cases of incompatibility, the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) must terminate respective activity or resign within 10 days after being elected as the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) and prior to taking the office; otherwise, the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall not accept the position. (9) Paragraphs 7 and 8 of this article in respect to the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) shall also apply to the deputies. 7. Powers of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) of the Kyrgyz Republic shall terminate ahead of the schedule in the following cases: 1) refusal of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) to continue to perform official duties expressed through submission of an application for resignation; 2) verdict and conviction of the court in respect to the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) comes into force; 3) decision of the court on recognition of the person that holds the position of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) as missing or dead comes into force; 4) death of a person that holds the position of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy); 5) breach of the oath by the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy); 6) accepting a position or failure to give up activities that are not compatible with the status of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) within 10 days after election; 7) termination or loss of the citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic; 8) decision of the court on disability of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy); 9) unfaithful, unprofessional or non impartial performance of duties. The same provisions shall also apply to deputies of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy). An ad hoc special commission of the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic must draw up an opinion concerning presence of rounds for an early removal of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) from the office which shall be approved by at least two thirds of the total number of members of such commission. The Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic shall consider the early dismissal of the Ombudsman (Akyikatchy) in presence of grounds as stated in this article and shall make a respective decision by at least 3/4 of votes of the Constitutional number of deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic. | Some of the rules on removal are a bit vague but require a 3/4 vote of parliament to remove |
| Malawi | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Constitution 129. There shall be a Human Rights Commission the primary functions of which shall be the protection and investigation of violations of the rights accorded by this Constitution or any other law. 130. The Human Rights Commission shall, with respect to the applications of an individual or class of persons, or on its own motion, have such powers of investigation and recommendation as are reasonably necessary for the effective promotion of the rights conferred by or under this Constitution, but shall not exercise a judicial or legislative function and shall not be given powers so to do. 131. (1) The Human Rights Commission shall consist of - a. the person for the time being holding the office of Law Commissioner; b. the person for the time being holding the position of Ombudsman: c. Provided that, save as prescribed by this section, no other member of the Human Rights Commission shall be a person in any public office or the President or Vice-President, a Minister or Deputy Minister or a member of Parliament. d. such persons as shall be nominated from time to time in that behalf by those organizations that are considered in the absolute discretion of both the Law Commissioner and the Ombudsman to be reputable organizations representative of Malawian Society and that are wholly or largely concerned with the promotion of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution or any other written law. 2. The Law Commissioner and the Ombudsman shall jointly refer the name of persons nominated under paragraph (c) of subsection (1) to the President who shall formally appoint such persons as members of the Human Rights Commission. 3. A member of the Human Rights Commission, other than a member by virtue of paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1), shall continue to be members of the Commission until such time as they are removed from office on the grounds of - a. incompetence; b. incapacity; or c. in circumstances where the member is compromised to the extent that his or her ability to impartially exercise the duties of his or her office is seriously in question. 5. (1) (Human Rights Commission Act) Appointed members of the Commission shall hold office for a term of three years, and shall be eligible for reappointment. | Appointment process seems to run through the Law Commissioner and the Ombudsman, who seem to be reasonably independent. |
| Maldives | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 44. (a) The Information Commissioner shall be appointed by the President, in accordance with this section. (b) Wherever the need to appoint the Information Commissioner arises, the President shall propose to the People’s Majlis at least three names. (c) The names that are submitted to the People’s Majlis in accordance with subsection (b) of this section shall comprise of those names that the President selected from among the people who answered a public announcement. The President shall also forward to the People’s Majlis, for its information, the names of all other respondents to the said public announcement. (d) The President shall appoint as Information Commissioner the person whose name is passed by a majority of those present at a session of People’s Majlis from the names submitted to the Majlis by the President in accordance with subsection (b) of this Section. 46(a) The term of office of the Information Commissioner who is appointed shall be 1 (one) term of 5 (five) years from the date of his appointment. (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, except in the circumstance when the Information Commissioner is dismissed from office as in under Section 48 of this Act, the People’s Majlis can approve the renewal of the appointment of the Information Commissioner for an additional term of not more than 5(five) years. 48. The Information Commissioner shall be dismissed from office, if found that he carried out an act unsuitable to the position of Information Commissioner, or if he is unable to discharge the responsibilities of the post or is incompetent to perform the responsibilities of the post, by the relevant Parliamentary Committee of the People’s Majlis, and upon the approval of such finding by the People’s Majlis by a majority of those present and voting, calling for the Commissioner’s removal from office. | |
| Mexico | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Constitutions Art. 6 A VIII: The Federation shall establish an autonomous, specialized, impartial and collegiate agency. It must have a legal personality; own assets; full technical, managerial and decision power over its budget and internal organization; and shall be responsible for guaranteeing the fulfillment of the right of access to public information and the protection of personal data held by public agencies (obligated subjects), according to the terms established by law. The autonomous transparency agency established in this fraction will be governed by the transparency and access to public information law, as well as the law for the protection on personal data held by obligated subjects, in the terms established by the general law issued by the Congress to set the basic principles, basis and procedures for the exercise of the information rights. This agency will be governed by the principles of certainty, legality, independence, impartiality, efficiency, objectiveness, professionalism, transparency and maximum publicity. The autonomous transparency agency has competence to receive inquiries related to the right of access to public information and the protection of personal data from any authority, entity, organism or agency that belongs to any of the Executive, Legislative or Judicial Powers, as well as any autonomous agency, political parties public trusts and public funds, or any other person, group, union or organization that receives or use public resources or that exercise authority at the federal domain with exception of those issues that correspond to the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, in which case a committee of three Supreme Court Justices would decide the issue. The autonomous transparency agency has, also the competence to receive the inquiries from individuals in regard to the resolutions issued by the local autonomous specialized transparency agencies and the Federal District transparency agency that ruled the in existence, reserve, and confidentiality of information or that refuses to disclose information according to the terms established by law. The National Transparency Agency [organismo garante], ex oficio or by substantiated petition of the local agency from the States or the Federal District may receive or analyze the inquiries that due to its importance or transcendence are in the interest of the National Transparency Agency. The law will determine the information that shall be considered as reserved or confidential. The resolutions of the National Transparency Agency are mandatory, definitive and indisputable for the obligated subjects (obligors). Only in the cases that the resolutions may be considered to endanger public security according to the law in the matter, the Legal Councilor of the Federal Government may present a review inquiry to the Supreme Court. The National Transparency Agency [organismo garante] shall be constituted by seven commissioners. To appoint them, the Senate, previous extensive consultation to social actors and by proposal of the different parliamentary groups, will appoint the commissioner with the vote of two-thirds of the Senators present in the session according to the vacancy that must be covered and following the procedure established by law. The President may oppose the appointment within ten business days. If the President does not oppose the appointment within the given days, then the person appointed by the Senate will assume the commissioner office. Given the case that the President opposes the appointment, the Senate will present a new proposal to occupy the vacancy according to the previous paragraph. However, to approve the proposal the vote of three-fifths of the Senators present is required. If this second appointment were objected, the Senate, according to the procedures in the previous paragraph, with the approval of three-fifths of the Senators present would appoint definitively the commissioner that will occupy the vacancy. The commissioner office will be held during seven years, and the commissioners shall fulfill the requirements provided in the fractions I, II, IV, V and VI of the article 95th of this Constitution. The commissioners shall not hold other office, have an additional employment, or other commission with exception of the non-profit chairs or offices related to charities and academic or scientific institutions. The commissioners can only be removed from office according to the terms in the Fourth Title of this Constitution and they will be subject to political trial. • Reference to science The conformation of the National Transparency Agency shall promote gender equality. The Commissioner President shall be selected by a peer process, through the secret vote of the commissioners. The Commissioner President will remain in office for three years, with the possibility of being reelected to other three years. The commissioner president must render an annual report before the Senate in the date and terms described by the law. The National Transparency Agency [organo garante] shall have an Advisory Board, formed with ten council members that shall be elected by the vote of two thirds of the present Senators. The law will establish the procedures to present the proposals to the Senate. Each year, the two council members with longer tenure will be replaced, unless they were proposed and ratified for a second term in office. The law will establish the emergency measures and procedures that the Agency could implement to guarantee the fulfillment of its decisions. Every authority and public servant is compelled to help the National Transparency Agency and its Commissioners for the adequate performance of the Agency. The National Transparency Agency will coordinate its actions with the Federal Superior Comptroller Office [Entidad de Fiscalizacion Superior de la Federacion], the entity specialized in archives and files, the organ in charge of gathering and process of statistical and geographical data, as well as, with the local agencies in the States and the Federal District in order to strengthen the accountability within the Mexican State. | For appointment, the Senate, after consulting with civil society, on a proposal by the parliamentary groups, will appoint commissioners on a vote requiring the approval of two thirds of the members present. The President has the power to challenge the vote within 10 working days. This is broadly in line with international standards. Removal requires impeachment under Title Four of the constitution. |
| Moldova | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Law on Parliamentary Advocates Article 12 The personality of Parliamentary Advocate is inviolable for the whole period of authority. Inviolability of Parliamentary Advocates also extends to their residence, offices, transportation and communication means, correspondence, documents and personal property. The Parliamentary Advocates cannot be convicted by criminal or administrative court, cannot be confined, arrested, searched, their property cannot be searched without prior consent of the Parliament, except in case of arrest on the scene of crime | |
| Monaco | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | A2-4, 40-44 of HRC Ordinance | Appointment procedure not that well protected against government control but points given. |
| Mongolia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | HR Commission Act 5.1. The Speaker of the State Great Hural (Parliament) shall nominate names for candidates for Commissioners to the State Great Hural on the basis of respective proposals by the President, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Legal Affairs and the Supreme Court. 5.2. If the State Great Hural declines to appoint a candidate as a Commissioner, then the Speaker of the State Great Hural shall submit the name of another person within 14 (fourteen) days in accordance with procedure provided in Art 5.1. 5.3. A name of the same person shall not be nominated again. 5.4. The State Great Hural shall consider and decide on this issue within 30 (thirty) days from the date of submission of the names for candidates. 5.5. In case any of Commissioners has been released, resigned from his/her official position or deceased before the expiry of the term of his/her office, the Great State Hural shall appoint replacement for that Commissioner within 60 (sixty) days from that date in accordance with this Law. 5.6. A Chief Commissioner shall be appointed for a term of 3 (three) years from among Commissioners by the State Great Hural, based on the proposal by the Speaker of the State Great Hural. 5.7. Commissioners shall not hold any job or office concurrently other than that mandated by this Law, except that of engaging in training and research. If any of Commissioners has been holding another job or office before his/her appointment, then he/she shall be released from that job or office from the day on which he/she has taken an oath of office. 6.1. A single term of office for Commissioners shall be 6 (six) years. 6.2. Powers of Commissioners shall start by taking an oath of office to the Constitution of Mongolia, and shall end by the swearing in of the newly appointed Commissioners. 6.3. Commissioners may be re-appointed only once. 8.1. The State Great Hural shall release a Commissioner from his/her office in the following cases: 8.1.1. A Commissioner has been nominated as a candidate for the President of Mongolia, or for the Member of the State Great Hural; 8.1.2. A Commissioner has been appointed or elected to another official position; 8.1.3. A Commissioner has requested on his/her own because he/she becomes unable to exercise his/her powers due to health conditions or for any other excusable reasons. 8.2. The State Great Hural shall discuss and make a decision within 14 (fourteen) days from the date of receipt of a proposal and decision from the competent authority on whether to suspend his/her powers, if a Commissioner has been implicated in the crime, as well as has been arrested as provided in Art 23.1. of this Law. 8.3. The State Great Hural shall restore his/her powers and adopt a resolution to that effect, on the basis of a decision by the competent authority or official, which has established that a Commissioner has not been implicated in the crime or not guilty of committing it. 8.4. The State Great Hural shall dismiss him/her from the office and adopt a resolution to that effect, if a crime, which has been proved to be committed by a Commissioner, and a final binding judgement to that effect by the Court has come into force. 23.1. If Commissioners has been arrested in a criminal act or on the site of crime with all implicating evidence, it shall be reported by the relevant official to the Chairperson of the State Great Hural within the following 24 (twenty four) hours. In all other cases it shall be prohibited to detain, imprison or impose administrative sanctions by way of a judicial process on Commissioners, and to conduct the search of his/her home, office room and body. 23.2. Unless otherwise provided by the law, it shall be prohibited to release and/or dismiss Commissioners as well as to transfer him/her to another job or official position without his/her consent. 23.3. It shall be prohibited to divulge the confidentiality of correspondence related to the exercise of powers by Commissioners. 23.4. Business entities, organisations and their officials and citizens shall have obligations to render all kinds of assistance to Commissioners in exercise of his/her powers. | A diffuse appointment process involving courts, parliament, etc. Arts 5, 8 and Art 23 provide security of tenure. |
| New Zealand | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 3 Ombudsmen (2) Subject to the provisions of section 7, each Ombudsman shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the House of Representatives. (...) 6 Removal or suspension from office (1) Any Ombudsman may at any time be removed or suspended from his office by the Governor-General, upon an address from the House of Representatives, for inability to perform the functions of the office, bankruptcy, neglect of duty, or misconduct. (2) At any time when Parliament is not in session, any Ombudsman may be suspended from his office by the Governor-General in Council for inability to perform the functions of the office, bankruptcy, neglect of duty, or misconduct proved to the satisfaction of the Governor-General; but any such suspension shall not continue in force beyond 2 months after the beginning of the next ensuing session of Parliament. | By convention, appointment procedure is by Parliament as a whole following report of a bipartisan committee (s. 3(2) Ombudsmen Act). Effectively they're appointed unanimously by MPs. Ombudsmen Act s. 6 – can be dismissed by Governor-General on advice of legislature if there are grounds to do so. |
| Niger | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Ombudsman Act. Section 3 | Ombudsman Act. Section 3 - can only be dismissed by constitutional court and are appointed by the judiciary. |
| North Macedonia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Art. 31 "(1) The Commission is consisted of five members, one of them is president and one is vice-president. The term of office of the members is five years with the right to re-appointment. The president and the vice-president perform their functions professionally. (2) Upon proposal from the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, the president, vice-president and the member of the Commission representing the nongovernmental sector shall be appointed and dismissed by the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, for a five-year period, with the right to re-appointment. (3) Two members of the Commission from among the Commission's expert service shall, upon proposal from the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, be appointed and dismissed by the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, for a five-year period and with the right to be re-elected. (4) The president of the Commission shall represent the Commission and shall govern its work. (5) The positions of the Commission president and vice-president, as well as the Commission member representing the nongovernmental sector shall be open for appointment to any person being citizen of the Republic of Macedonia, being respected and distinguished in the fields of information and access to information of public character. (6) During their mandates, the Commission president, vice-president and members may not perform duties within political parties' bodies. (7) The Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia shall dismiss the Commission president, vice-president or member prior to the expiration of their mandates, in cases of a proposal from the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, upon personal request from these persons, in case of these persons' illness which will prevent them from performing their duties, or when such persons hall act contrary to the provisions of the present Law. (8) If under paragraph (7) of this Article the position of the Commission member or its deputy ceases, prior to the expiration of their term of office, the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, upon proposal from the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, shall appoint new Commission member with a new term of office." | |
| Norway | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Act concerning the Storting’s Ombudsman for Public Administration. Article 1 (Election of Ombudsman) After each Gerneral Election the Storting shall elect an Ombusdman for the Public Administration, the Civl Ombudsman. The election is for a period of four years reckoned from 1 january of the year following the General Election. [...] He must not be a member of the Storting. [...] If the Presidium of the Storting should deem the Ombudsman to be disqualified to deal with a particular matter, it shall elect a substitute Ombudsman to deal with the said matter." | The law does not provide the external appeal for the common decision. The Ombudsman is a dual body. It is internal body for the decisions of Parliament and Ministry. And also external body for final administrative decisions. |
| Panama | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Artículo 12: El director general será nombrado por el Órgano Ejecutivo y ratificado por la Asamblea Nacional, para un periodo de siete años prorrogable por una sola vez. | Art 12 of Law 33 of 2013: appointed by the executive, but must be ratified by the national assembly. Art 19 states that he may only be removed by the Supreme Court. |
| Portugal | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Art 26. Composition: " 1. CADA shall be composed of the following members: a) One Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court, who shall be appointed by the Supreme Council of Administrative and Fiscal Courts and shall chair the Commission; b) Two Members of the Assembly of the Republic, to be appointed by the latter, one upon a proposal from the parliamentary group of the largest political party which supports the Government, and one upon a proposal from the largest opposition party; c) A Professor of Law, to be appointed by the President of the Assembly of the Republic; d) Two prominent persons, to be appointed by the Government; e) One prominent person appointed by the Governments of each of the autonomous regions; f) One prominent person, to be appointed by the National Association of Portuguese Municipalities (ANMP); g) A lawyer, to be appointed by the Lawyers’ Order; h) One member, to be appointed by the National Data Protection Commission (CNPD) from among its own members. 2. Full members shall be substituted by substitute members appointed by the same persons and bodies. 3. The members of CADA shall be installed in the presence of the President of the Assembly of the Republic within the ten days following the publication of the list of the Commission’s members in Series I of the Diário da República. 4. Their terms of office shall be for two years, shall be renewable, and shall terminate upon the installation of new members." | |
| Russia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Federal Law on the Prosecutor&'s Office of the Russian Federation, Article 12(1): (Appointment to the position of Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation): The Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation shall be appointed and removed from office by the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the recommendation of the President of the Russian Federation. | |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 35(1), (3), (4) | |
| Serbia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Article 30. Paragraph 1: "The National Assembly shall appoint the Creditor by a majority of the votes of its National Deputies, on the proposal of the Committee of State Administration (hereinafter: the Committee)" Article 31: "The Trusteeshop shall cease: 1) at the end of the mandate; 2) death; 3) on cheek requests 4) to those who lose their nationality; 5) how his business capacity will be limited by a court order; 6) as a criminal offender, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of at least six months; 7) dismissal. A commissioner who, during his term in office, is in receipt of an old-age pension in accordance with the law, shall cease to hold offie at the end of his term or office. In the events of a lapse in the duties of the Credentials for the reasons set out in paragraph 1(2) to (6) of this article, the National Assembly shall, without discussion, by a majority vote of its Members of the National Assembly, adopt a decision establishing the date of the lapse oin the duties of the Credentials." | The commissioner will be elected by the The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. The tenure is secured, because the commissioner can only be removed by The National Assembly, by a majority of votes of all members of parliament. |
| Seychelles | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 37. (1) The President shall in consultation with the Speaker of the National Assembly appoint to the Commission from among the candidates proposed by the Constitutional Appointments Authority, a Chief Information Commissioner and two Information Commissioners. (2) The proposal of the Constitutional Appointments Authority shall be on the basis of the experience and knowledge specified in subsection (3) and qualification specified in section 38. (3) A person to be appointed as a Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner shall have wide experience and knowledge in any one or more of the following fields of services— (a) accounting; (b) administration and governance; (c) law; (d) science and technology; (e) management; or (f) social sciences. (4) The term of office, salary and allowances of Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners shall be such as may be prescribed. 39.(1) The Chief Information Commissioner or an Information Commissioner may resign upon giving two month’s written notice, to the President. (2) The office of the Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner, as the case may be, shall become vacant— (a) if absent from three consecutive meetings of the Commission, uthoutreasonab1e excuse; (b) if adjudged bankrupt; (c) if convicted of an offence under any written law and sentenced therefor to imprisonment for a term of six months or more, without the option of a fine; (d) if declared to be of unsound mind or physically incapable for carrying out the functions of the Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner as the case may be; or (e) upon death. (3) Where a vacancy arises for any reason whatsoever in the office of the Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner before the expiry of the term of office, the person appointed to till such vacancy shall hold office for the remainder of the term for which his or her predecessor in office would have held office if such vacancy had not occurred. 40.(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2), (3) and (4), the President may remove from office the Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner on grounds of gross misbehavior. (2) Where a complaint, allegation or report of misbehaviour against the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioner is received and the President is prima fame satisfied that it shall be enquired into, the President shall refer the matter to the Chief Justice of Supreme Court for enquiry and report. (3) Where a question of removing the Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner is referred to the Chief Justice, the President may suspend the Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner as the case may be, from performing the functions of the Commission but the suspension shall cease to have effect if the Chief Justice recommends to the President that the Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner, as the case may be, ought not be removed from office. (4) The Chief Justice shall on a reference made under subsection (2) hold an enquiry and recommend to the President that Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner ought to be removed on such ground or grounds and the President shall act accordingly. | |
| Sierra Leone | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 31. (1) The Commission shall consist of the Information Commissioner who shall be the Chairperson of the Commission and four other Commissioners representing each of the Provinces and the Western Area. (2) Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister and approved by Parliament. | The legal framework does not contain any mechanism for dismissing the Information Commissioner which, along with the fixed term length, effectively grants the office security of tenure. However, although full points are awarded here, it is worth noting that better practice legislation should have some mechanism for dismissing the Information Commissioner in the event of, for example, incapacitation, and that security of tenure should be provided by procedural safeguards here, such as requiring the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to assent to the dismissal. |
| Slovenia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Art. 29 (Status of the Commissioner and dismissal of the Commissioner from office) "- Deleted; See the Information Commissioner Act -" | |
| South Africa | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Appointment 41(2)(a) [of the Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013] The Chairperson and the members of the Regulator referred to in subsection (1)(a) must be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National Assembly, which recommendation must also indicate which ordinary members must be appointed in a full-time or part-time capacity. (b) The National Assembly must recommend persons— (i) nominated by a committee of the Assembly composed of members of parties represented in the Assembly; and (ii) approved by the Assembly by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the members of the Assembly. (5) A person appointed as a member of the Regulator may, upon written notice to the President, resign from office. (6) (a) A member may be removed from office only on— (i) the ground of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence; (ii) a finding to that effect by a committee of the National Assembly; and (iii) the adoption by the National Assembly of a resolution calling for that person’s removal from office. (b) A resolution of the National Assembly concerning the removal from office of a member of the Regulator must be adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the members of the Assembly. (c) The President— (i) may suspend a member from office at any time after the start of the proceedings of a committee of the National Assembly for the removal of that member; and (ii) must remove a member from office upon adoption by the Assembly of the resolution calling for that member’s removal. | |
| Sri Lanka | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Section 12. (1) The Commission shall consist of five persons appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Constitutional Council. In making such recommendations, the Constitutional Council shall recommend one person nominated by each of the following organisations or categories of organisations:- (a) Bar Association of Sri Lanka which shall nominate an Attorney-at-Law of eminence or a Legal Academic in consultation with Attorneys -at-Law and Legal Academia; (b) organizations of publishers, editors and media persons; (c) other civil society organizations ... (6) The members of the Commission shall hold office for a period of five years. Schedule, clause (2) The President may on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council remove from office a member of the Commission, where:- (a) such member has become permanently incapable of performing his or her duties owing to any physical disability or unsoundness of mind; (b) such member is unfit to perform his or her duties on the basis of moral turpitude; or (c) such member is convicted of an offence by a competent court of law. | |
| Sweden | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | The Instrument of Government, Chapter 13, Article 6: "The Riksdag elects one or more Parliamentary Ombudsmen …" The Riksdag Act, Chapter 13, Article 3: "The Parliamentary Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen are elected individually. When an Ombudsman is elected by secret ballot, the same procedure is applied as for the election of Speakers. A Parliamentary Ombudsman is elected for the period from the date of his or her election, or a later date as determined by the Riksdag, until a new election has been held in the fourth year thereafter and the person then elected has assumed office. The election shall never be valid beyond the end of that year. A Deputy Ombudsman is elected for a period of two years from the date of his or her election, or a later date determined by the Riksdag." Article 4: "In response to a proposal from the Committee on the Constitution, the Riksdag may remove an Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman from office who has forfeited the confidence of the Riksdag." | |
| Tunisia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Art. 38 - L’Instance est notamment chargée, de : - statuer sur les recours qui lui sont soumis en matière d’accès à l’information. Elle peut à cet effet et en cas de besoin, mener les investigations nécessaires sur place auprès de l’organisme concerné, accomplir toutes les procédures d’instruction et auditionner toute personne dont l’audition est jugée utile, - informer tous les organismes concernés et le demandeur d’accès personnellement, de ses décisions, - publier ses décisions sur son propre site web, - suivre l’engagement en matière de diffusion proactive, sur initiative de l'organisme concerné, des informations mentionnées aux articles 6, 7 et 8 de la présente loi, et ce, par auto saisine de la part de l’instance ou suite à des requêtes émanant d’un tiers, - émettre obligatoirement un avis sur les projets de lois et les textes réglementaires ayant lien avec le domaine d’accès à l’information, - promouvoir la culture d’accès à l’information en coordination avec les organismes soumis aux dispositions de la présente loi et la société civile, à travers des actions de sensibilisation et de formation destinées au public, - évaluer périodiquement la consécration du droit d’accès à l’information par les organismes soumis aux dispositions de la présente loi, - préparer un rapport d’activité annuel contenant les suggestions et les recommandations nécessaires à la consécration du droit d’accès à l’information, ainsi que des données statistiques concernant le nombre des demandes d’accès à l’information, le nombre des recours, les réponses et les délais y afférents, ses décisions prises et le suivi annuel de leurs mises en œuvre par les organismes soumis aux dispositions de la présente loi, - échanger les expériences et l’expertise avec ses homologues étrangères et les organisations internationales spécialisées et conclure des conventions de coopération dans ce domaine. L’instance soumet le rapport annuel au Président de la République, au président de l’assemblée des représentants du peuple et au chef du gouvernement. Ce rapport sera publié au public sur le site web de l’instance. | |
| Ukraine | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | Law of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Article 5.1 The Commissioner shall be appointed to his or her post and shall be dismissed from his or her post by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by a secret ballot vote. Article 5.6 The Commissioner shall be appointed for the term of five years, commencing from the day of his or her taking oath at the session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 6.1 Proposals for candidate(s) to the post of the Commissioner shall be made by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or by no less than one-fourth of People’s Deputies of Ukraine of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. A respective Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the basis of the special check provided for by Article 5 of this Law shall submit its conclusions to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on each candidate to the post of the Commissioner, on how the candidate meets the requirements envisaged by the Law, and on the absence of reasons which would prevent the candidate from holding this post. 6.2 The candidate to the post of the Commissioner shall be nominated within twenty days, commencing from the next day after: 1) this Law has entered into force; 2) the term of office of the Commissioner has expired, his or her authority has been terminated or in the event of his or her dismissal; 3) the results of voting have been announced, if the Commissioner has not been appointed. 6.3 Voting shall be conducted during plenary sessions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by a secret ballot vote but no earlier than ten days and no later than twenty days after deadline for nomination of candidates for participation in election. 6.4 The candidate shall not be deemed appointed until he or she receives the majority of votes from People’s Deputies of Ukraine making up the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, with the resolution adopted thereof. 6.5 Should more than two candidates to the post of the Commissioner be nominated and none of them is appointed, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall repeat voting between the two candidates who have won the majority of votes. 6.6 Repeat voting on the appointment of the Commissioner shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure established by this Article. 6.7 Candidates to the post of the Commissioner shall be nominated again if none of the candidates received the required number of votes. 9.1 The authority of the Commissioner shall be terminated in such cases: 1) the Commissioner refuses to further perform his or her duties by submitting a statement of resignation; 2) verdict of guilty of a court against him or her has come into effect; 3) court decision according to which a person holding the post of the Commissioner is considered missing or deceased has come into effect; 4) the newly-elected Commissioner has taken the oath; 5) person holding the post of the Commissioner has deceased. 9.2 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall adopt the resolution on dismissal from the post of the Commissioner before the expiration of term to which he or she has been elected, in case of: 1) violation of the oath; 2) incompliance with the requirements of incompatibility of the post of the Commissioner; 3) termination of citizenship of Ukraine; 4) inability to perform duties for more than four months in a row due to unsatisfactory health conditions or inability to work. 9.3 The Temporary Special Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall conclude whether there are grounds to dismiss the Commissioner from the post. 9.4 If such grounds exist, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall consider this issue and adopt a respective resolution on dismissing the Commissioner from the post following an application by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine or no fewer than one-fourth of People’s Deputies of Ukraine of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 9.5 The Commissioner is considered dismissed from the post if the majority of People’s Deputies of Ukraine of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine voted in favour of it. 9.6 Termination of authority and dismissal of the Commissioner from the post shall be legalized by a respective resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. | |
| Vanuatu | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | YES | 2 | 52. Appointment of Information Commissioner (1) The Judicial Service Commission is to appoint a person to be the Information Commissioner. (2) The Information Commissioner is to hold office for a period of 5 years and is eligible for reappointment for 1 term only. (3) A person is not to be appointed as an Information Commissioner unless his or her appointment has undergone a fair and transparent selection process and is based on merit. 54. Removal of Information Commissioner (1) The Judicial Service Commission may remove a person as the Information Commissioner if it is satisfied that the person: (a) is incapacitated by physical or mental illness; or (b) is declared bankrupt by a Court; or (c) has been convicted and sentenced by a Court for an offence not being a road traffic offence; or (d) has performed unsatisfactorily or ineffectively for a significant period of time; or (e) is the holder of a public office; or (f) exercises a position of responsibility in a political party; or (g) engages during his or her term in office in any paid employment outside the functions of his or her office; or (h) has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect his or her functions as an Information Commissioner under this Act. | - |
| Afghanistan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 20(1) In order to select the members of the commission, a selection committee shall be formed with the following structure: 1. Minister of Information and Culture, as the chairman. 2. A member of Supreme Court based on decision of Supreme Court’s High Council, as member 3. A member of the Religious, Cultural, Education and Higher Education Committee of the Lower House, as member 4. Member of the Religious, Cultural and Higher Education Committee of the Upper House, as member. 5. Head of legislative affairs of ministry of justice as a member. 6. A member of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission as elected by it, as member 7. One elected representative of journalists’ unions, as member 8. Authorized representative of Independent Bar Association, as member (2) Ministry of Information and Culture shall function as the secretariat of the committee. (3) The Selection Committee shall announce acceptance of application for membership of the commission after five working days following its first meeting. (4) The Selection Committee shall identify 21 qualified candidates through a competitive process and introduce them to the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan within 10 working days after the end of the vacancy announcement. (5) The President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan shall choose 7 out of 21 candidates considering their professional background and gender-balance as members of the commission with following terms: 1. Four member for the period of five years. 2. Three member for the period of three years. (6) Members of commission shall be appointed for 5 years in the following terms. (7) Members of the commission can only be appointed for one term based on clause (5) and (6) of this article. (8) Members of the Commission shall not hold any job during their tenure except teaching in a higher education institutions. 26(1) Any member of the Commission shall lose membership in the following circumstances: 1-A written resignation after it is approved by the President. 2-Physical and mental incapacity which prevents the member from performing his/her duties. 3-Sentence to imprisonment for more than six months. 4-Provision of false information to fulfill membership criteria. 5-Completion of tenure. 6-Lack of observing laws, regulations, rules, and procedures related to the Commission. (2) If a member of Commission loses membership in one of the cases mentioned in Clause (1) and more than one year of her/his tenure remains, the Ministry of Information and Culture shall call the Selection Committee as mentioned in Article 20 (1) within 10 work days and the Selection Committee shall announce acceptance of application and Curriculum Vitas (CVs) for vacant membership of the Commission. (3) The committee shall introduce two qualified candidates from among all candidates to the President. (4) The President shall choose one as a member of the Commission for the remaining time period. 27. The five members of the commission shall decide the circumstances under Clause 2, 4, 6 of the Article 26 to dismiss one of its members. | Strong protections for tenure and good appointments procedure but, ultimately, one point deducted due to undue role for Minister of Information in appointments process (chair and secretariat of selection committee) |
| Argentina | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | ARTÍCULO 21° — Procedimiento de selección del director. El procedimiento de selección del director de la Agencia de Acceso a la Información Pública se llevará a cabo de conformidad con lo dispuesto a continuación: a) El Poder Ejecutivo nacional propondrá una (1) persona y publicará el nombre, apellido y los antecedentes curriculares de la misma en el Boletín Oficial y en dos (2) diarios de circulación nacional, durante tres (3) días; b) El candidato deberá presentar una declaración jurada conforme la normativa prevista en la Ley de Ética en el Ejercicio de la Función Pública, 25.188, y su reglamentación; c) Se requerirá a la Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos (AFIP) un informe relativo al cumplimiento de las obligaciones impositivas del candidato; d) Se celebrará una audiencia pública a los efectos de evaluar las observaciones previstas de acuerdo con lo que establezca la reglamentación; e) Los ciudadanos, las organizaciones no gubernamentales, los colegios, las asociaciones profesionales y las entidades académicas podrán, en el plazo de quince (15) días contados desde la última publicación en el Boletín Oficial prevista en el inciso a) del presente artículo, presentar al organismo a cargo de la organización de la audiencia pública, por escrito y de modo fundado y documentado, observaciones respecto de los candidatos. Sin perjuicio de las presentaciones que se realicen en el mismo plazo podrá requerirse opinión a organizaciones de relevancia en el ámbito profesional, judicial y académico a los fines de su valoración; f) Dentro de los quince (15) días, contados desde el vencimiento del plazo establecido en el inciso e) del presente artículo, se deberá celebrar una audiencia pública para la evaluación de las observaciones presentadas. Con posterioridad y en un plazo de siete (7) días de celebrada la audiencia, el Poder Ejecutivo nacional tomará la decisión de confirmar o retirar la candidatura de la persona propuesta, debiendo en este último caso proponer a un nuevo candidato y reiniciar el procedimiento de selección. | There is a requirement for public consultations and vetting, but the fact that the Director of the Agency for Access to Public Information is both proposed and confirmed by the executive is problematic. |
| Belize | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | N/A | There is some procedure surrounding their dismissal in the Ombudsman Act - requirement for an investigation by the Belize Advisory Council. |
| Chile | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | ARTICLE 36. La dirección y administración superiores del Consejo corresponderán a un Consejo Directivo integrado por cuatro consejeros designados por el Presidente de la República, previo acuerdo del Senado, adoptado por los dos tercios de sus miembros en ejercicio. El Presidente hará la proposición en un solo acto y el Senado deberá pronunciarse respecto de la propuesta como una unidad. Los consejeros durarán seis años en sus cargos pudiendo ser designados sólo para un nuevo período. Se renovarán por parcialidades de tres años. El Consejo Directivo elegirá de entre sus miembros a su Presidente. Para el caso de que no haya acuerdo, la designación del Presidente se hará por sorteo. La presidencia del Consejo será rotativa. El Presidente durará dieciocho meses en el ejercicio de sus funciones, y no podrá ser reelegido por el resto de su actual período como consejero. | Art 36 - appointment requires agreement between president and senate, but generally the procedures to guarantee independence are weak. But tenure is protected since members can only be removed by the Supreme Court upon approval of legislature or senate. |
| El Salvador | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | ARTICLE 56 Los Comisionados podrán ser removidos de sus cargos por el Presidente de la República en los casos siguientes: a. Cuando hayan sido condenados por delitos. b. Por actos u omisiones que afecten gravemente el buen funcionamiento del Instituto y por incumplimiento de sus funciones. c. Por incapacidad o inhabilidad sobreviniente. d. Por divulgar o utilizar información reservada o confidencial, por mala fe o negligencia. | Appointed by the president, but Art 52 has procedures to protect the process: president has to choose the commissioners from lists prepared by independent organziations (journalists, etc). Art 56 allows the president to remove Commissioners for relatively broad grounds. |
| Finland | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | [The Constitution of Finland] Article 38. The Parliament appoints for a term of four years a Parliamentary Ombudsman and two Deputy Ombudsmen, who shall have outstanding knowledge of law. | The Parliamentary ombudsman is appointed by the parliament, The Chancellor of Justice is appointed by the President. Nevertheless, all these authorities are responsible for the legality of their actions. |
| Ghana | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 48(1) The governing body of the Commission is a Board consisting of (a) a chairperson; (b) one deputy chairperson; (c) four other persons, two of whom are women; and (d) the Executive Secretary. (2) The members of the Board shall be appointed by the President in accordance with article 70 of the Constitution. 49(1) A member of the Board shall hold office for five years and is eligible for re-appointment for another term only. (2) A member of the Board may, at any time, by notice in writing to the President resign from office. (3) The Commission shall notify the President of vacancies which occur in the membership of the Board within two months of the occurrence of the vacancy. (4) The President may, by a letter addressed to a member of the Board, terminate the appointment of that member where that member (a) is mentally or physically incapable of performing the functions and duties of the office; (b) is declared insolvent; (c) has engaged in gross misconduct or has been involved in actions that bring the Commission into disrepute; (d) is convicted of a serious offence; or (e) is grossly incompetent. (5) The President shall not terminate the appointment of a member of the Board unless the President has caused to be investigated an allegation made against that member and the allegation has been proven. 55(2) The President shall, in accordance with article 195 of the Constitution appoint the Executive Secretary for the Commission. 57 The President may, in accordance with article 195 of the Constitution, appoint officers and other employees that are necessary for the effective implementation of the functions of the Commission. 58(1) The President shall, in accordance with article 195 of the Constitution, appoint a Secretary to the Board. | Only limited rules on appointments and relatively weak protection against removal. President also appoints the Executive Secretary, Secretary and even staff. |
| Guinea | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 48. La CAIP est composée de Sept (7) membres choisis ainsi qu'il suit: - Un représentant des cours et tribunaux - Un fonctionnaire de l'Assemblée Nationale; - Un représentant de l'ordre des avocats; - Un représentant de la société civile; - Un représentant de l'association des journalistes de Guinée;- Un représentant de l'Administration publique désigné par le ministre de la Fonction publique; - Un représentant du Ministére de l'information et de la communication;- Ces membres sont choisis en raison de leurs qualifications et de leurs comptétences en rapport avec les missions dela CAPI et pour leur probite. 49. Les membres de la CAIP sont nommés par Décret du Président de la république, pour un mandat de cinq (5) ans non renouvelable. | No information on dismissal given and two government members. |
| Indonesia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 31(1) The President of the Republic of Indonesia nominate 21 (twenty one) potential candidate Commissioners of the Central Information Commission to the Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia as a result of the recruitment as referred to in Article 30 paragraph (2). (2) Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia elects the Commissioners of the Central Information Commission by a due diligence test. (3) The Commissioners of the Central Information Commission who have been elected by the Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia are subsequently appointed by the President. 34(1) A member of the Information Commission is dismissed by the decision of the Information Commission in accordance with his/her official position, and is proposed to the President for the Central Information Commission, to the Governor for the Provincial Information Commission, and to the Regent/Mayor for the district/municipal Information Commission to decide. | 31 - nominated by president but appointed by parliament. The fact that the agency head is elected by the agency members. 34(1) says the head can only be dismissed on recommendation of the information commission, but the other members can be dismissed by the president. These provide some protection, but fall short of best practices. |
| Ivory Coast | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | Decree 2014-462 of 6 August 2014, 5(1). La CAIDP comprend douze membres désignés ci-après et nommés ès- qualité par décret pris en Conseil des Ministres : - un professionnel de la communication désigné par le Président de la République: - un député désigné par le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale ; - un expert documentaliste désigné par le Premier Ministre ; - un spécialiste des médias désigné par le Ministre chargé de la Communication ; - un membre désigné par le Ministre chargé de l'Intérieur ; - un membre désigné par le Ministre chargé de l'Economie et des Finances ; - un membre désigné par le Ministre chargé de la Défense ; - un magistrat désigné par le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature ; - un avocat désigné par le Barreau ; - un enseignant chercheur en Droit désigné par les Universités publiques ; - un expert des Droits de l'Homme désigné par les organisations de défense des Droits de l'Homme ; - un journaliste professionnel désigné par les organismes professionnels des médias. (2) Le décret qui nomme les membres de la CAIDP désigne également le Président. (3) Les organismes professionnels des médias concernés par les dispositions qui précèdent, sont ceux régulièrement constitués et qui justifient d'au moins cinq ans d'existence. (4) Ces organismes professionnels du secteur des médias, désignent leur représentant, à l'issue d'une assemblée organisée à cet effet, sous la supervision du Ministère en charge de la Communication. (5) Les membres de la CAIDP sont appelés Commissaires de l'Accès à l'Information. 6(1). Les Commissaires de l'Accès à l'Information sont nommés par décret pris en Conseil des Ministres, sur présentation du Ministre chargé de la Communication, pour un mandat d’une durée de six ans non renouvelable. (2) Toutefois, pour la constitution initiale de la CAIDP, la durée du mandat est de trois ans pour les Commissaires suivants: - le député désigné par le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale. - l'expert documentaliste désigné par le Premier Ministre ; - le membre désigné par le Ministre chargé de la Défense ; - le membre désigné par les organismes professionnels des médias ; - le membre désigné par les organisations de défense des Droits de l'Homme ; - l'avocat désigné par le Barreau. (4) Ainsi, la CAIDP se renouvelle de moitié tous les trois ans. (5) Tout Commissaire de l'Accès à l'Information conserve son mandat jusqu’à la date d'entrée en fonction de son successeur. 12: Il ne peut être mis fin aux fonctions de Commissaire de l'Accès à l'Information avant l'expiration de son mandat que dans les cas ci-après : - démission ; - décès ; - empêchement absolu constaté, notamment en cas d'incapacité physique - ou mentale d'exercer ses fonctions. | 6 of the 12 members of the CAIDP are nominated by the president and different ministers, and the cabinet designates the chair, while others are nominated by the National Assembly (vice-chair), the bar association, public universities, human rights organisations and professional media organisations. Full points not awarded due to the number of government-appointed members. |
| Japan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 23(7) When the Prime Minister concludes that a member is not able to carry out his or her duties due to a physical or mental difficulty, or concludes that a member has acted in contravention of official duties or that there has been some other misconduct unbecoming of a member, he or she, on receiving the approval of both Houses, may dismiss that member. | |
| Liberia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 5.1: "Oversight Body: The implementation of this Act, including compliance therewith, shall be overseen an independent Information Commissioner to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Liberian Senate. The Independent Information Commissioner shall be a Liberian of high moral character and generally acceptable to many stakeholders. The Independent Information Commissioner shall serve full-time, and receive compensation at least equal to that receive by a Circuit Judge. The work of the Information Commissioner and the Technical Secretariat to support his or her work shall be funded by the Government through the National budget. The Informational Commissioner shall enjoy operational, investigatory and regulatory autonomy, and general independence in the exercise of his or her work." | 5.1 - appointed by president with consent of senate, and mentions need that they be acceptable to many stakeholders. |
| Liechtenstein | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | Article 32 (law). | |
| Luxembourg | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | A11(1): La Commission d’accès aux documents est composée de cinq membres, dont un magistrat, un représentant du Premier ministre, ministre d’État, un représentant de la Commission nationale pour la protection des données, un représentant du Syndicat des villes et communes luxembourgeoises et un représentant du Service information et presse du Gouvernement. Les membres de la Commission d’accès aux documents sont nommés pour une durée de quatre ans par le Grand-Duc sur proposition du Premier ministre, ministre d’État. La présidence est assurée par le magistrat. | Several government members but security of tenure is guaranteed |
| Morocco | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 23(1) La commission visée à l'article 22 ci-dessus est présidée par le président de la Commission nationale de contrôle de la protection des données à caractère personnel, instituée en vertu de l'article 27 de la loi n° 09-08. Elle est composée de : — deux représentants des administrations publiques nommés par le Chef du gouvernement ; — un membre nommé par le président de la Chambre des représentants ; —un membre nommé par le président de la Chambre des conseillers ; —un représentant de l'Instance nationale de la probité, de la prévention et de la lutte contre la corruption ; —un représentant de l'institution « Archives du Maroc » ; —un représentant du Conseil national des droits de l'Homme ; —un représentant du Médiateur ; —un représentant de l'une des associations oeuvrant dans le domaine du droit d'accès à l'information, désigné par le Chef du gouvernement. (2) Le président de la commission peut inviter à ses réunions, à titre consultatif, toute personne, organisme ou représentant d'une administration ou faire appel à son expertise. (3) Les membres de la commission sont désignés pour une durée de cinq (5) ans, renouvelable une seule fois. | Weak in this area; President from Data Protection body 2 officials appointed by head of gov., 2 members from 2 legislative bodies, 4 from various oversight bodies and one from CS also nominated by head of gov.; tenure is 5 years but not clear if can be removed or on what conditions; secretariat services provided by Data Protection body |
| Namibia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 5(1) In terms of subsection (3), the President must appoint an independent and impartial person as Information Commissioner to promote, monitor and protect the right of access to information in Namibia. (2) The Information Commissioner is assisted by one or more Deputy Information Commissioner appointed by the President in terms of subsection (3). (3) The President appoints, in writing, the Information Commissioner or a Deputy Information Commissioner after the National Assembly by resolution approves the appointment of a candidate from a list of two to three candidates nominated by the Selection Committee. 6(1) There is established a Selection Committee for the purposes of - (a) shortlisting, interviewing, selecting and nominating candidates for - (i) approval of the National Assembly by a resolution; and (ii) subsequent appointment by the President as Information Commissioner or Deputy Information Commissioner; and (b) selecting and nominating persons for appointment as members of a committee under section 14(3). (2) Subject to subsection (4), the Selection Committee consists of - (a) the chairperson of the Public Service Commission established by section 2 of the Public Service Commission Act, 1990 (Act No. 2 of 1990), who is the chairperson of the Selection Committee; (b) the chairperson of the Council of the Law Society of Namibia referred to in section 45 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1995 (Act No. 15 of 1995), who is the deputy chairperson of the Selection Committee; (c) the Executive Director of the Ministry administering information; (d) the chief executive officer of the Communications Regulatory Authority of Namibia established by section 4 of the Communications Act, 2009 (Act No. 8 of 2009); and (e) a person - (i) nominated by non-governmental organisations established in terms of the laws of Namibia dealing with the media; and (ii) appointed by the Minister together with his or her alternate from a list of not more than three persons. (3) The Minister must, for the purposes of selecting persons for appointment as contemplated in subsection (1)(e), in at least two local newspapers circulating nationally, request interested non-governmental organisations to submit, within 30 days of publication of the notice in the newspapers, the names of persons complying with the requirements for appointment as a member of the Selection Committee. (4) The chairperson of the Selection Committee must make sure that, as far as practicable, no gender has more than three members on the Committee by arranging that the second in charge of an institution as contemplated in subsection (5) may replace a respective member to create gender balance. (5) Subject to subsection (6), if a member of the Selection Committee is unable to attend a meeting of the Selection Committee - (a) a member of the Public Service Commission designated by the Commission, the vice-chairperson of the Council of the Law Society, the Deputy Executive Director of the Ministry administering information, the chief operations officer of the Communications Regulatory Authority of Namibia or the alternate member appointed under subsection (2)(e)(ii), respectively; or (b) a person appointed to act as such in the absence of any functionary referred to in paragraph (a), must attend the meeting of the Selection Committee in the place of the member who is unable to attend the meeting. (6) All five members of the Selection Committee form a quorum for the purposes of any meeting of the Committee. (7) The majority of the members of the Selection Committee present and voting at the meeting of the Committee constitute the decision of the Committee. (8) The Secretary to the National Assembly must serve as the secretary at meetings of the Selection Committee. (9) The Minister may, with the approval of the National Assembly, prescribe the - (a) terms and conditions of appointment as members of the Selection Committee; (b) procedures to be followed at meetings of the Selection Committee; and (c) advertisement of the vacancies, applications for appointment, and shortlisting of candidates for interviews and selection process for nomination for appointment as Information Commissioner or Deputy Information Commissioner. 12. The Information Commissioner or a Deputy Information Commissioner holds office for a term of five years, and is eligible for reappointment on the expiry of that term, but a person may not serve for more than two terms of office. 14(1) Subject to this section, the President may remove the Information Commissioner or a Deputy Information Commissioner from office if the Information Commissioner or Deputy Information Commissioner - (a) fails to comply with a term or condition of his or her contract of appointment; (b) by reason of his or her physical or mental illness, incompetence or any other reason, is incapable of efficiently exercising or performing his or her powers or functions; or (c) is found guilty of a prescribed act of misconduct. (2) If the question of any inquiry into an alleged non-compliance, incapacity, incompetence or act of miscoduct of the Information Commissioner or Deputy Information Commissioner contemplated in subsection (1) arises, the President must immediately notify the Speaker of the National Assembly. (3) The Speaker of the National Assembly must, within five days after receipt of the notice under subsection (2), notify the Selection Committee to nominate persons for appointment by the President as members of a committee - (a) to inquire into the matter; and (b) to submit a report and recommendations to the President. (4) The committee contemplated in subsection (3) consists of - (a) a chairperson who - (i) is a retired magistrate or a judge of the High Court or Supreme Court of Namibia; or (ii) is a legal practitioner with 10 or more years of post-admission experience; and (b) two other persons who have 10 or more years of experience in their field of expertise relevant to the powers and functions of the Information Commissioner and are fit and proper persons of integrity. (5) The Secretary to the National Assembly must serve as the secretary at meetings of the committee contemplated in subsection (3). (6) If the inquiry into the action of misconduct of the Information Commissioner or a Deputy Information Commissioner is referred to the committee, the President -(a) may suspend the Information Commissioner or Deputy Information Commissioner from exercising and performing the powers and functions of his or her office, pending the inquiry by the committee; and (b) must immediately cancel the suspension imposed under paragraph (a), if -(i) the conditions for suspension lapse; or (ii) the committee recommends to the President that the appointment of the Information Commissioner or Deputy Information Commissioner is not to be terminated. (7) The committee contemplated in subsection (3) must - (a) inquire into the matter in accordance with the procedure that conforms to the rules of natural justice; and (b) within 21 days after conclusion of the inquiry, submit its report and recommendations to the President. (8) If the recommendation of the committee referred to in subsection (3) is that the Information Commissioner or Deputy Information Commissioner must be removed from office, the President must refer the recommendation and the reasons for the recommendation to the Speaker of National Assembly - (a) within seven days after receipt of the recommendation if the National Assembly is in session; or (b) if the National Assembly is not then in session, within seven days after the next session of the National Assembly starts. (9) On adoption by the National Assembly of a resolution calling for the termination of appointment of the Information Commissioner or a Deputy Information Commissioner, the President must, immediately on receipt of the resolution, by notice in writing, terminate the appointment of the Information Commissioner or Deputy Information Commissioner. | There are two government representatives on the Selection Committee - Chair of Public Service Commission and CEO of ministry responsible for information (s. 6(2)) - out of five members. And Minister sets meeting and other rules (s. 6(9)). Note also that staff of the Commission are seconded from government (s. 17(1)). |
| Nepal | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 11(3) In order to appoint Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioner, there shall be a committee comprised as follows: (a) The Speaker – Chairperson (b) Minister or State Minister for Information and Communication – Member (c) President, Federation of Nepalese Journalists – Member. 14. Tenure of Office: (1) The tenure of office of the Chief Information Commissioner and the Information Commissioner shall be for five years and s/he shall not be re-appointed in the same Post. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-Section (1), the Information Commissioner may be re-appointed in the post of Chief Information Commissioner subject to the provision of tenure of office stated in the same Sub- Section. (3) The recommendation committee pursuant to Sub-Section (3) of Section 11, shall recommend for new appointment of Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners one month period to the expiry of the tenure of the office. 15. Post to be Vacated: The post the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioner shall be considered vacant under the following conditions: (a) In case of his/her death, (b) In case, s/he completes the age of 65 years, (c) In case, s/he tenders resignation to the Prime Minister, (d) In case, his/her term of office is completed, (e) In case, s/he is convicted by the court in a criminal offence with moral turpitude, (f) In case of s/he is removed from the post pursuant to 16. 16. May Remove From Office: If the meeting of the Legislature-Parliament endorse the recommendation of the information and communication related committee of the Legislature-Parliament, with the two third majority of meeting presented by at least two third members out of total members, for removing Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner on the ground that s/he is not fit to hold office for the reason of incompetence or misbehavior or not carrying out the duties honestly, such Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner shall be removed from his/her office. Provided that, the Chief Information Commissioner or Information Commissioner charged with such accusation shall not be denied for reasonable opportunity of clarification. | There are government officials on the appointments committee but strong security of tenure. |
| Pakistan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 18(3) The Information Commission shall comprise three Commissioners to be appointed by the Prime Minister, with the following composition; namely:- (a) one member shall be from amongst the persons qualified to be a Judge of a High Court; (b) one member who has been in the service of Pakistan in BS-22 or equivalent; (c) One member shall be from civil society having a degree based on sixteen years of education from a recognized institution and experience of not less than fifteen years in the field of social sciences; (5) The Information Commission shall be headed by the Chief Information Commissioner, who shall be appointed by the Prime Minister from amongst the Commissioners; (7) The Chief Information Commissioner and the Commissioners shall not hold any other public office or be connected with any political party at the time of or during their appointment in the Information Commission and, once appointed, they shall work on full time basis and may not run any business or pursue any profession during their tenure as the Chief Information Commissioner and Commissioners; (8) The Chief Information Commissioner and Commissioners shall be removed if there are serious complaints of mental and physical incapacity and misconduct against them, which are materially inconsistent with the status of being Chief Information Commissioner or, as the case may be, a Commissioner. The complaint shall be lodged before a five-member Parliamentary Committee comprising two Senators nominated by the Chairman Senate and three Members of National Assembly nominated by the Speaker National Assembly. The Speaker National Assembly shall nominate one of the five members as the Chairperson of the said Parliamentary Committee: Provided that where the National Assembly stands dissolved the Parliamentary Committee shall comprise five Senators and the Chairman Senate shall nominate one of the five Senators as Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee. | Strong security of tenure but appointed by PM so not protected against interference. |
| Rwanda | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | N/A | Appointment procedure fits the bill - proposed by the gov't and elected by the senate. But LAW N° 17/2005 OF 18/08/2005 allows the Ombudsman to be dismissed "if it is clear that he or she is no longer honest, or no longer has commitment, wisdom, analysis and capacity on which his or her election was based at the time of his or her approval." This decision is in the hands of the Senate - but still problematic. |
| South Korea | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 19(1) When any applicant is dissatisfied with a decision made by a public institution in connection with information disclosure, or when no decision is made about whether to disclose information even after 20 days elapse after a request for information disclosure was made, he/she may file an administrative appeal as prescribed by the Administrative Appeals Act. In such case, the administrative agency that supervises the decision of a public institution, other than state agencies and local governments, shall be the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of the relevant local government. (2) An applicant may file an administrative appeal without going through the procedures for filing administrative appeals under Article 18. | Tenure and some protection against interference but latter weak. |
| South Sudan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 35 - appointed by President from candidates selected by the Minister in consultation w media and civil society, and then approved by the legislature. No security of tenure w s. 36. | |
| Togo | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | Article 2 : Le Médiateur de la République est une authorité administrative indépendante. Article 3: (1) Le Médiateur de la République est nommé par décret en Conseil des ministres. La durée de son mandat est de trois (03) ans renouvelable. | Loi 2003-021. Security of tenure but not independent appointsments procedure. |
| Trinidad and Tobago | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 91. (1) There shall be an Ombudsman for Trinidad and Tobago who shall be an officer of Parliament and who shall not hold any other office of emolument whether in the public service or otherwise nor engage in any occupation for reward other than the duties of his office. (2) The Ombudsman shall be appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. (3) The Ombudsman shall hold office for a term not exceeding five years and is eligible for re-appointment. (4) Subject to subsection (3), the Ombudsman shall hold office in accordance with section 136. (5) Before entering upon the duties of his office, the Ombudsman shall take and subscribe the oath of office before the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 136. (8) A decision that the question of removing the officer from office ought to be investigated may be made at any time- (a) in the case of the Ombudsman, by resolution of the House of Representatives; and (b) in any other case, by the President either on his own initiative or upon the representation of the Prime Minister. | Constitution s. 91 requires "consultation" with the opposition, but the position is nonetheless appointed by the president. Constitution 136(8) allows parliament initiate an investigation into the dismissal of the Ombudsman, which will be carried out by an independent tribunal. This seems a reasonable guarantee of tenure. |
| United Kingdom | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | Section 18. | Strictly speaking it's not independent because it's the Queen that appoints; we grant 1 point for security of tenure. |
| Venezuela | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | Ley Orgánica de la Defensoría del Pueblo 17. Forma de elección. El Defensor o Defensora del Pueblo será designado o designada por un único período de siete años por la Asamblea Nacional, mediante el voto favorable de las dos terceras partes de sus integrantes, según lo establecido en el artículo 279 de la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. 25. Cesación y declaración de vacancia del cargo. El Defensor o Defensora del Pueblo cesará en sus funciones por cualquiera de las siguientes causales: 1) Por renuncia al cargo o muerte del titular. 2) Por incapacidad sobrevenida certificada por junta médica designada por el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia. 3) Por expiración del período constitucional de su designación.4) Por haber incurrido en cualquiera de las incompatibilidades previstas en esta Ley. 5) Por haber sido condenado o condenada, en sentencia definitivamente firme, con excepción de delitos políticos. La Asamblea Nacional declarará la vacante del cargo en los casos referidos a los numerales 1, 3 y 5 de este artículo. En los demás casos la remoción se decidirá por las dos terceras partes de los miembros de la Asamblea Nacional, mediante debate y con notificación para la audiencia del interesado o la interesada, con garantías del debido proceso y previo pronunciamiento del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia. En el caso del numeral 2 de este artículo, la Asamblea Nacional solicitará, con el voto de la mayoría simple de sus miembros, la designación de la junta médica por el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, quien certificará dicha incapacidad antes de proceder a la remoción. Vacante el cargo, se iniciará el procedimiento para la designación del nuevo Defensor o la nueva Defensora del Pueblo, en un plazo no mayor de treinta días continuos, según lo establecido en el artículo 279 de la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. 26. Vacancia y ausencias temporales. En los casos de declaratoria de vacancia del cargo o de ausencias temporales del Defensor o Defensora del Pueblo, y en tanto no se proceda a una nueva designación, desempeñará sus funciones interinamente el Director o Directora Ejecutiva. Si una ausencia temporal del Defensor o Defensora del Pueblo se prolonga por más de noventa días continuos, la Asamblea Nacional decidirá, por las dos terceras partes de sus integrantes, si debe considerarse que hay un cese de sus funciones. Constitution 279. El Consejo Moral Republicano convocará un Comité de Evaluación de Postulaciones del Poder Ciudadano, el cual estará integrado por representantes de diversos sectores de la sociedad; adelantará un proceso público de cuyo resultado se obtendrá una terna por cada órgano del Poder Ciudadano, la cual será sometida a la consideración de la Asamblea Nacional. Esta, mediante el voto favorable de las dos terceras partes de sus integrantes, escogerá en un lapso no mayor de treinta días continuos, al o a la titular del órgano del Poder Ciudadano que esté en consideración. Si concluido este lapso no hay acuerdo en la Asamblea Nacional, el Poder Electoral someterá la terna a consulta popular. En caso de no haber sido convocado el Comité de Evaluación de Postulaciones del Poder Ciudadano, la Asamblea Nacional procederá, dentro del plazo que determine la ley, a la designación del titular o la titular del órgano del Poder Ciudadano correspondiente. Los o las integrantes del Poder Ciudadano serán removidos por la Asamblea Nacional, previo pronunciamiento del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, de acuerdo con lo establecido en la ley. | The Constitution requires 2/3 majority vote in the National Assembly, after an evaluating committee made up of diverse representatives from sectors of society nominates candidates. However, it seems that they evaluating committee is not mandatory as National Assembly can appoint without it; the Law establishing the Ombudsman does not elaborate on this part of the procedure. Also, in 2014, the Constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice issued an opinion stating only a majority (instead of 2/3) vote is needed if the evaluating committee procedure is not followed. With this legal interpretation whomever holds the National Assembly can effectively decide, so not much protection against political appointees. |
| Yemen | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | 33: "The Office is headed by the Information Commissioner general in the rank of minister appointed by the President of the Republic and he shall preside over the office for four years, renewable for one time only." 38: "The services of the Commissioner General shall end in the following conditions: A. If he is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and loyalty B. If he worked in any other position or rank C. In the case of the death of the Commissioner-General." | The Commissioner General is appointed by the President - Art 33. However, Art 38 allows for dismissal only if convicted, deceased, or if the Commissioner holds another job. |
| Zambia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | Const. 240 general conditions for appointments. Human Rights Commission Act, 2023 (https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/related_documents/N.A.B%208%20The%20Human%20Rights%20Commission%20Bill%202023-1.pdf) 7(1) (appointed by Pres. subject to ratification by parl), 7(4) tenure, 7(5) removals, including 7(5)(g) by Pres without conditions | |
| Zimbabwe | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | Partially | 1 | A237 of 2013 Const. 1. For the purpose of nominating persons for appointment to any independent Commission, the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders must-- a. advertise the position; b. invite the public to make nominations; c. conduct public interviews of prospective candidates; d. prepare a list of the appropriate number of nominees for appointment; and e. submit the list to the President. 2. A member of an independent Commission may be removed from office only on the ground that the member concerned-- a. is unable to perform the functions of his or her office because of physical or mental incapacity; b. has been grossly incompetent; c. has been guilty of gross misconduct; or d. has become ineligible for appointment to the Commission concerned. 3. The procedure for the removal of judges from office applies to the removal from office of a member of an independent Commission. A 248 of Const. 1. There is a commission to be known as the Zimbabwe Media Commission consisting of-a. a chairperson appointed by the President after consultation with the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders; and b. eight other members appointed by the President from a list of not fewer than twelve nominees submitted by the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders. 2. Members of the Zimbabwe Media Commission must be chosen for their integrity and their competence in administration and their knowledge and understanding of human rights issues and the best practices in media matters. | Significant powers of the President but Parliament also involved; no apparent reference to tenure |
| Andorra | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Article 24: 2. The members of the CNAAD referred to in letters d) to h) of the previous section are appointed by the Government Article 24: 2. Els membres de la CNAAD referits a les lletres d) a h) de l’apartat anterior són nomenats pel Govern | |
| Australia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 Reg. 14 Appointment (1) The Australian Information Commissioner is to be appointed by the Governor‑General by written instrument. [...Same for FOI Commissioner and Privacy Commissioner.] Reg. 15 General terms and conditions of appointment (3) An information officer holds office on the terms and conditions (if any), in relation to matters not covered by this Act, that are determined by the Governor‑General. Reg. 20 Termination of appointment (1) The Governor‑General may terminate the appointment of an information officer for misbehaviour or physical or mental incapacity. (2) The Governor‑General must terminate the appointment of an information officer if any of the following apply: (a) the information officer: (i) becomes bankrupt (...) (b) the information officer is absent, except on leave of absence, for 14 consecutive days or for 28 days in any 12 months; (c) the information officer engages, except with the Minister’s approval, in paid employment outside the duties of his or her office; (d) the information officer fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with section 29 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which deals with the duty to disclose interests) or rules made for the purposes of that section. | OAIC Act Reg. 14 – appointed by the Governor-General. Since Reg. 15(3) gives the Governor-General a broad power to decide terms and conditions of holding the office, a Commissioner could easily be dismissed for "misbehaviour" under Reg. 20(1). |
| Austria | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned |
| Belgium | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Loi n° 94-1724. Article 8.1 establishes that the King with the agreement of the Council of Ministers will decide the composition and the functioning of the Commission. | |
| Brazil | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Article 35. The Commission for Reassessment of Information, consisting of State Ministers and representatives from the Legislative and Judiciary branches appointed by their respective presidents, shall be in frequent contact with the Chief of Staff of the Presidency of the Republic and under the jurisdiction of the federal government.(...) | No - Art 35 suggests the bodies are not independent, and the specifics are to be established by regulation (none are yet in force). |
| Bulgaria | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Cape Verde | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | No independent appeal |
| China | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | |
| Colombia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | The head of the Public Ministry is chosen by the Senate from a list of names offered by Supreme Court, Conseil d´Etat and the Presidente. There is security of tenure because he has to be removed from office by a Court - but the Public Ministry's inability to hear appeals makes Colombia ineligible for points here. |
| Cook Islands | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | 3. Ombudsman - (...)(2) Subject to the provisions of section 7 of this Act, the Ombudsman shall be appointed by the Queen's Representative on the advice of the Prime Minister who shall convey the recommendations of Parliament. 6. Conclusive reasons for withholding official information – Good reason for withholding official information exists, for the purpose of section 5 of this Act, if the making available of that information would be likely to - (a) prejudice the security or defence of the Cook Islands or the international relations of the Government of the Cook Islands; or (b) prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of the Cook Islands on a basis of confidence by– (i) the government of any other country or any agency of such a government; or (ii) any international organisation; or (c) prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial; or (d) endanger the safety of any person; or (e) damage the economy of the Cook Islands by disclosing prematurely decisions to change or continue Government economic or financial policies relating to – (i) the regulation of banking or credit; (ii) taxation; (iii) the stability, control, and adjustment of prices of goods and other costs, and rates or wages, salaries, and other incomes; (iv) the borrowing of money by the Government of the Cook Islands; and (v) the entering into of overseas trade agreements. | Ombudsman Act - Art 3(2) - appointed by GG on advice of PM - no protection. Art 6 - no security of tenure. |
| Costa Rica | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Cyprus | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned |
| Czech Republic | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Dominican Republic | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| East Timor | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | No administrative level of appeal |
| Ecuador | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned |
| Estonia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Personal Data Protection Act 36. Appointment and release of head of Data Protection Inspectorate from office (1) The Government of the Republic shall appoint the head of Data Protection Inspectorate to office for a term of five years at the proposal of the Minister of Justice after having heard the opinion of the Constitutional Committee of the Riigikogu. | The head of Data Protection Inspectorate is appointed by the government |
| Guatemala | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Guyana | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | 6(1) The President may remove the Commissioner of Information from office if the Commissioner of Information (a) is adjudged an insolvent; (b) has been convicted of an offence which involves moral turpitude; (c) is unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or body; or (d) had, or has, acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as Commissioner of Information. | 6(1) allows the commissioner to be removed by the president. There are limited grounds for removal, but also limited ways to fight the removal - beyond the right of the commissioner to make a representation. |
| Hungary | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Iceland | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Tenure not mentioned and commissioners are appointed by Prime Minister. |
| Iran | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Article 18. In order to support the freedom of information and public access to the existing information in public and private institutions that provide public service, a commission on publication and free access to information is established by the order of the president to formulate necessary executive plans for public notification, overall overseeing over the performance of duties and resolution of conflicts in the ways the information related to this law are presented, considering consistency in action and providing guidance and consultation in the following: (A) Minister of Culture and Islamic guidance (head of the commission). (B) Minister of communication and information technology or related deputy. (C) Minister of Information or related deputy. (D) Minster of Defense or related deputy. (E) Head of institution for management and planning or related deputy. (F) Head of administrative justice department. (G) Head of cultural commission in the parliament of Islamic Republic of Iran. (H) Secretory general of High Council of information technology. Note 1 - The secretariat of the mentioned commission should be established in the ministry of culture and Islamic guidance. The manners the meetings should be held in addition to its management and duties of secretariat will be recommended by the commission and will be approved by cabinet. Note 2 - Resolutions passed by the commission on publication and free access to information and approved by the president are binding. | |
| Israel | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Italy | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Jamaica | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | 2nd schedule - Articles 1 and 7. Technically the GG's has to approve them, but the structure of Jamaica's system minimizes his influence. Practically speaking it is a political appointment. |
| Jordan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | 3(a) A board shall be formed by virtue of the herein Law under the name of (Information Board), to be formed as follows: [...] | 3(a) - The oversight body is overtly political. |
| Kazakhstan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Kuwait | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | No independent administrative oversight is provided for. |
| Latvia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Lebanon | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Although the law specifies that appeals lie with the Anti-Corruption Body, the government has yet to pass legislation creating that body. In the interim, no points are awarded here. |
| Lithuania | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Malta | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Not mentioned. | |
| Montenegro | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Not mentioned. | |
| Mozambique | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned |
| Netherlands | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | No oversight body listed. | |
| Nicaragua | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Nigeria | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Palau | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Not mentioned | |
| Paraguay | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | |
| Peru | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Philippines | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | |
| Poland | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | There is no independent oversight body. | |
| Qatar | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Not mentioned | |
| Republic of Belarus | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Not mentioned | |
| Romania | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | No independent oversight body listed. | |
| San Marino | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | 25(2). The Directorate General of the Civil Service monitors the correct application of the provisions on access and verifies, at the request of the Administrations concerned, the legitimacy of the requests, the conformity of the methods of exercise and the application of any limits placed on the exercise of access. | The appointment procedures for the Directorate General of the Civil Service are not outlined in this legislation, and it would not appear to be an independent body. |
| Saudi Arabia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Slovakia | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| Spain | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Artículo 35(Composición): El Consejo de Transparencia y Bueno Gobierno estará compuesto por los siguientes árganos: a) La Comisión de Transparencia y Buen Gobierno. b) El Presidente del Consejo de Transparencia y Buen Gobierno que lo será también de su Comisión. Artículo 36(Comisión de Transparencia y Buen Gobierno.): 1. La Comisión de Transparencia y Buen Gobierno ejercerá todas las competencias que le asigna esta Ley, así como aquéllas que les sean atribuidas en su normativa de desarrollo. 2. Dicha Comisión estará compuesta por: a) El Presidente. b) Un Diputado. c) Un Senador. d) Un representante del Tribunal de Cuentas. e) Un representante del Defensor del Pueblo. f) Un representante de la Agencia Española de Protección de Datos. g) Un representante de la Secretaría de Estado y Administraciones Públicas. h) Un representante de la Autoridad de Responsabilidad Fiscal. Artículo 37 (Presidente del Consejo de Transparencia y Buen Gobierno): 1. El Presidente del Consejo de Transparencia y Buen Gobierno será nombrado por un período no renovable de cinco años mediante Real Decreto, a propuesta del titular del Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas entre personas de reconocido prestigio y competencia profesional previa comparecencia de la persona propuesta para el cargo ante la Comisión correspondiente del Congreso de los Diputados. El Congreso a través de la Comisión competente, y por acuerdo adoptado por mayoría absoluta, deberá refrendar el nombramiento del candidato propuesto en el plazo de un mes natural desde la recepción de la correspondiente comunicación. | La independencia del Consejo de la Transparencia no queda asegurada por lo establecido en esta ley, el desarrollo reglamentario de este organismo puede aportar mayor independencia pero aun no ha sido aprobado. |
| Sudan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | 4(2) The Commission shall include one full-time commissioner and seven members with the necessary expertise, skills and competence on a part-time basis. (3) The Commission is subject to the oversight of the competent minister. 6. The Council of Ministers appoints a commissioner from among those with the necessary expertise and competence, based on a recommendation from the competent minister, to perform the duties, implement the jurisdiction and exercise the powers stipulated in this law, and the decision shall define his allocations. 7. The Commissioner shall oversee operational activities relating to the enforcement of the right to access information and oversight, and, without prejudice to what to the above, the commissioner shall have the following competences: (j) Implement and follow on the decisions and directives of the competent minister; 19. The Commissioner shall issue, with the approval of the competent minister, the necessary regulations and orders to implement the provisions of this law. | Tenure is not mentioned and the appointments are done by government. |
| Switzerland | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Not mentioned. | |
| Taiwan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned |
| Tajikistan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | |
| Tanzania | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | |
| Thailand | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | 27 and 30 - OIC is completely political and subject to dismissal. Members of the OIC are either government officials or persons appointed by the cabinet. |
| Turkey | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | No mention about this. |
| Uganda | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned. |
| United States | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | |
| Uruguay | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | Artículo 19. (Órgano de control).- Créase como órgano desconcentrado de la Agencia para el Desarrollo del Gobierno de Gestión Electrónica y la Sociedad de la Información y del Conocimiento (AGESIC), dotado de la más amplia autonomía técnica, la Unidad de Acceso a la Información Pública. Estará dirigida por un Consejo Ejecutivo integrado por tres miembros: el Director Ejecutivo de AGESIC y dos miembros designados por el Poder Ejecutivo entre personas que por sus antecedentes personales, profesionales y de conocimiento en la materia aseguren independencia de criterio, eficiencia, objetividad e imparcialidad en el desempeño de sus cargos. A excepción del Director Ejecutivo de la AGESIC, los miembros durarán cuatro años en sus cargos, pudiendo ser designados nuevamente. Sólo cesarán por la expiración de su mandato y designación de sus sucesores, o por su remoción dispuesta por el Poder Ejecutivo en los casos de ineptitud, omisión o delito, conforme a las garantías del debido proceso. La presidencia del Consejo Ejecutivo será rotativa anualmente entre los dos miembros designados por el Poder Ejecutivo para dicho órgano y tendrá a su cargo la representación del mismo y la ejecución de las actividades necesarias para el cumplimiento de sus resoluciones. | Art 19 mentions that they will only be removed according to due process, but does not explain this. |
| Uzbekistan | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned |
| Vietnam | The member(s) of the oversight body are appointed in a manner that is protected against political interference and have security of tenure so that they are protected against arbitrary dismissal (procedurally/substantively) once appointed. | Score: 1 point for appointment procedure, 1 point for security of tenure | 2 | NO | 0 | N/A | Not mentioned |
